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WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS AS LEADERS, MENTORS, AUTHORS: THE CASE OF HUME SCHOLARSHIP

I will here discuss three issues. First, a main problem: the implicit biases that disadvantage women philosophers at nearly all stages of their careers as well as the phenomenon of stereotype that can lead women to underperform intellectually; second, the value of mentoring and sponsorship for strategically positioning women to eventually assume leadership roles in philosophy; and third, what women philosophers can do in leadership roles, in particular, including other women and helping to advance their careers. I will draw on my own experience as a woman philosopher who has worked primarily in Hume scholarship and successfully started a mentoring program for early career women. I will start by focusing on a climate of bias and its effects, and then turn to consider the resources we have at hand to combat it. I argue that we can make our discipline a more inclusive place that ultimately benefits all of us in terms of diversity of perspectives and a wealth of ideas with which to advance scholarship in philosophy.

I. Implicit bias

Let me begin by briefly reviewing what implicit bias is and contrasting it with explicit bias. Explicit bias, with regards to women, typically takes the form of outright gender discrimination. It can include sexual discrimination, for example, in terms of job or fellowship opportu-
nities and exclusion from conversations, meetings and decision-making. Sexual discrimination broadly construed also includes sexual harassment; in terms of the US law sexual harassment includes both quid quo pro, or the promise of advancement (or avoidance of retaliation) in return for sexual favors, and the creation of a hostile work environment through unwanted sexual advances: inappropriate language, including propositions, and conduct, the use of pornography, as well as the exclusionary strategies mentioned above\(^1\). Legal remedies in the US include criminal punishment when harassment rises to the level of assault (we do not yet have gender discrimination as a form of hate activity, but an argument could be advanced for this\(^2\)), and civil remedies, e.g., through litigation, when women’s civil rights are violated. Renewed attention has recently been given to Title IX protections in the US. Title IX was initially passed to deal with racial and sexual discrimination with respect to education. It evolved to cover athletics programs, and most recently, due to concerns made evident to the Obama administration, Title IX efforts focus on sexual harassment and education, offering new legal protections and ways to report discrimination, especially for girls and women. On university and college campuses new policies have been implemented to allow for greater reporting of sexual assault.

A difficult and gray area here concerns sexual exploitation. In academia, and in philosophy in a number of recent instances in the US, sexual exploitation often occurs when relatively privileged male academics, authority figures holding an academic position and with a reputation for their scholarship, exploit the admiration of often younger and lower status women, usually students. Sexual exploitation is often not illegal since sexual relations may be consensual, but it is a troubling phenomenon insofar as it reflects a power imbalance with an admired authority figure taking advantage of a relatively powerless individual (who may lack any recourse should a relationship take a turn for the worse). This form of sexual exploitation also


replicates and sustains a traditional paradigm of paternalism and sexual inequality.\(^3\)

The explicit biases of sexual discrimination discussed above differ from implicit bias. Explicit biases reflect conscious attitudes, e.g., the belief that women enjoy being sexually available for men. An implicit bias, by contrast, is held at an unconscious level so that someone automatically invokes a positive or negative stereotype (men are better at philosophy, women are no good at logic) that influences attitudes and behavior.\(^4\) The most common implicit biases studied to date are directed towards members of particular social groups, e.g., members of minority racial or ethnic groups, women, the elderly, the overweight, and so on. Significant research has been conducted on how implicit biases affect job searches, disadvantaging racial minorities, women and the elderly.\(^5\) Common implicit gender biases have to do with who is good at what: boys are good at science and math; girls are good at languages and arts. These implicit biases have been demonstrated to affect how well girls and boys do in these areas of study due to a phenomenon called stereotype threat, which I discuss below.

How does implicit gender bias work in philosophy? There are many ways. Some include men dominating conversations in conference sessions; not recognizing women who wish to speak; interrupting or talking over women who are speaking; all male or mostly male representation at conferences and workshops or in edited volumes and special issues of journals; identifying young men as “stars” but not

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\(^5\) For a study of how curriculum vitae with either male or female names elicited implicit bias among scientists, see C.A. MOSS-RACUSIN, J.F. DOVIDIO, V.L. BRESOLI, M.J. GRAHAM & J. HANDELSMAN, *Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students*, «Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America», 109, 2012, 41, pp. 16474-16479. Women students were viewed as less competent, and offered lower salaries than the men. In an interview with the New York Times, Jo Handelsman observed that many of the scientists claimed they would not be biased since they were trained to analyze data objectively. See <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/science/bias-persists-against-women-of-science-a-study-says.html>.
doing the same for young women; and recommending men but not women for academic positions or fellowships. Let me take the Hume Society and Hume scholarship as an example. From its earliest days, the Hume Society has been a fairly inclusive organization. Several women who have achieved professional prominence were among its earliest members, including Jane McIntyre, Charlotte Brown, and the late Annette Baier. The Hume Society has a healthy proportion of women members, with a woman President, women on the Executive Committee, women on the Editorial Board of the journal «Hume Studies», and a woman editor at the helm of the journal. Women regularly serve as co-directors for the annual international Hume conference. Nevertheless, neither Society representation nor Hume scholarship are without problems with respect to gender.

A recent international Hume Conference serves as a good example. At the Business Meeting of the previous year’s conference, one of the co-directors for the upcoming conference gave an overview of the organization including the lineup of invited speakers: he named 11 male philosophers and one woman who due to health issues was certain not to attend. The Hume Society also sponsors groups sessions at the national and regional philosophy conferences in North America; these typically have three speakers and up to three commentators. As recently as 2013, at least one group session had an all male lineup – and it was in fact a case of young male “stars” giving presentations; it was striking to me that no young woman had been identified by the organizer as one of these stars. Outside the purview of the Hume Society, and with respect to edited volumes, there are several from the second half of the 20th century with only male contributors. One prominent case in point is the 1994 edition of the Cambridge Companion to Hume, edited by the late David Fate Norton, which has 11 chapters each authored by a male Hume scholar. The 2015 Humean Readings conference, held at La Sapienza in Rome, had seven male speakers (most of whom have received more than one invitation to this annual conference), and no women.

What do the men say when queried about the all male representation? The responses vary from “I didn’t even think about it [more balanced gender representation],” to “It’s been on my mind” and here the implication is: but I have not done anything about it; to apologies and a promise not to do it in the future; to defensive replies that a woman (or two) was asked but declined to attend or contribute. What are the effects of imbalanced gender representation?
They include a further privileging of the already privileged: those who enjoy a high status because of institutional affiliation, for example, or because they are the protégées of those with high-ranking institutional affiliation. Young male “stars” thus get inserted into high reward networks, and unconsciously cultivate attitudes reflecting the bias that men are better at philosophy or certain topics in philosophy. The already privileged receive a generous proportion of invitations to speak or contribute to volumes or journals; those with less visibility due to implicit bias simply do not. The reputation of the already privileged is thus reinforced by their visibility in conference lineups and publications. Many women who could have contributed to a conference or publication are in effect sidelined and rendered yet more invisible. Some effects that many may not think about include missed opportunities for diversity: the inclusion of new perspectives and identification of hitherto neglected issues, new methodologies and approaches.

How can we combat implicit bias? We have a variety of ways of doing so. Let me discuss what was in fact done in the examples that I gave above. In the case of the Hume conference discussed above, I politely asked that the organizer do more than merely think about having eleven male philosophers and no women as invited speakers. I reminded the organizer about the significant proportion of women members in the Hume Society, and that many would make excellent invited speakers. With respect to the recent Hume Society group session, many reminded the male organizer in question that such all-male lineups should be things of the past. Anne Jaap Jacobson reviewed the *Cambridge Companion to Hume* for a prominent journal, and did not hesitate to point out that all the chapters had male authors.

What are the effects of speaking up? I should point out that there can sometimes be negative effects, including anger directed towards one, as happened to me at that Hume Society Business Meeting. Of course, many others praised her for having the courage to speak out. Anne Jacobson also blogged about the incident on Feminist Philosophers, reminding readers of the costs one may incur by speaking up. Yet the whole incident had a very positive outcome: the program for the conference included as keynote speakers, two women philosophers and one woman intellectual historian (and to my mind, two of these talks were the best of the conference). In this year’s Hume Society group session, the organizer invited two men and two women
as speakers, and personally told me he realized his mistake of the previous year. David Fate Norton was invited to publish a second edition of the *Cambridge Companion to Hume* (2009), and he invited Jane McIntyre and me to contribute chapters, leading to a more balanced volume. I also assumed the role of co-editor of this edition.

There are other and far-reaching effects of challenging implicit bias. The inclusion of women eventually gains attention. People notice that the research may be cutting edge in whole new ways: feminist or post-colonial methodologies, new topics such as the passions and embodiment or the social construction of social markers such as class, sex or gender. Women philosophers also have more opportunity to serve as role models for both male and female philosophers. I have been told a number of times by women that they felt encouraged to speak up when they normally wouldn’t because of the example set by senior women. Women feel encouraged to submit papers to conferences and journals. The greater visibility of women thus serves to encourage women to think that they can have a career as philosophers and that they have something to say. I mentioned women as role models for men as well; let me give you an example of this. Until about the 1980’s there had been very little scholarship on Hume’s account of the passions, arguably one of the most significant parts of his philosophy. There had been Páll Árdal’s book, *Passion and Value in Hume’s Philosophy*, which appeared in the 1960’s, but in the 1970’s Jane McIntyre began publishing on the passions, linking this aspect of Hume’s philosophy to his account of personal identity as well as his account of character. In 1990, the Hume Conference, held in Canberra and organized by David Norton and Knud Haakonsen, had as one of its themes «Personal Identity and the Passions». There was no shortage of papers on this theme at the conference, including one by keynote speaker Annette Baier, and just about everyone cited or expressed their indebtedness to McIntyre’s work.

II. Stereotype Threat

Jenessa Shapiro and Joshua Aronson define stereotype threat as «the concern that one’s performance or actions can be seen through the
lens of a negative stereotype»\(^6\). Those who study stereotype threat focus on the distressing psychological experience of those to whom such negative stereotypes apply. In addition to raising concerns about one’s intellectual abilities or performance, stereotype threat can also lead to self-defeating behavior (such as not studying enough) that sets the individual up for failure rather than success. The psychological effects of stereotype threat include a decreased sense of competence, lowered self-confidence about performance, anxiety, and feelings of dejection. There are also physical effects, such as raised blood pressure\(^7\). The studies reveal that stereotype is situational, and gets put in play in situations requiring intellectual performance and where a stigma is made salient. For example, having to indicate one’s gender prior to taking a math test creates a stereotype threat condition that can lead to underperformance by females\(^8\). The stereotype threat condition can also affect memory resources due to intrusive negative thoughts; such thoughts can linger and influence performance on subsequent non-stereotype laden tasks\(^9\). Conversely, being a male in the case of the math test requiring prior gender identification can produce stereotype lift, an enhanced performance beyond what is typical for the individual since the individual is not a member of the stigmatized group\(^10\). In contrast to the situation in which gender is made salient, individuals are more


\(^7\) Ibid., p. 97.

\(^8\) In one striking example, in which girls underperformed on the Advanced Placement calculus test under stereotype threat conditions, the study authors argue that had the test situation corrected for stereotype threat, 4763 more young women would have received AP calculus credit in the US in 2004; see K. DANAHER & C.S. CRANDALL, Stereotype threat in applied settings re-examined, «Journal of Applied Social Psychology», 38, 2008, pp. 1639-1655. A French study found similar underperformance; see E. NEUVILLE & J.C. CROIZET, Can salience of gender identity impair math performance among 7-8 year old girls? The moderating role of task difficulty, «European Journal of Psychology of Education», 22, 2007, pp. 307-316. For an Italian study, see B. MUZZATTI & F. AGNOLI, Gender and mathematics: Attitudes and stereotype threat susceptibility in Italian children, «Developmental Psychology» 43, 2007, pp. 747-759.

\(^9\) SHAPIRO & ARONSON, Stereotype Threat, p. 100.

likely to perform to their ability in situations where no stereotype threat condition exists. Jennifer Saul suggests that the stereotyping of mathematics as a particular ability of men rather than women extends to logic, creating a stereotype threat for women in philosophy.\(^{11}\)

As Shapiro and Aronson observe, «any cue in the environment that makes negative stereotypes salient can elicit stereotype threat», including being in the minority in an organizational or academic setting.\(^ {12}\) Given the underrepresentation of women in philosophy, being the only woman or part of a small minority of women in a philosophy department, whether as faculty or student, or at a conference could then be stereotype threat inducing for those individuals.\(^ {13}\) Again, the effects of stereotype threat in producing a lowered sense of competence and of confidence, along with anxiety or dejection can all have devastating effects on women’s performance. Being a minority woman or a woman from a low socioeconomic status may increase the likelihood of underperformance.\(^ {14}\) Neither the awareness that others regard one as less intellectually capable, nor having to deal with ongoing psychological stress or negatively impacted physical health, will typically serve to foster the aspiration or ambition to succeed in the academy. Shapiro and Aronson look at the specific nature of the stereotype threat, identifying four main kinds: self-concept

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threat as the fear that one does possess the stigmatized feature; group-concept threat as the fear that one’s group members possess the stigmatized feature; own-reputation threat as the fear that others view one as possessing the negative feature; and group-reputation threat as the fear of reinforcing in others the reputation of one’s group as possessing the negative feature.\(^{15}\)

Shapiro and Aronson also suggest remedies to reduce the effects of stereotype threat regarding intellectual ability and performance. One way is to change how the task or situation is framed, removing the stereotype threat cues. Another is to change the stated outcome of the task, explicitly not connecting it with a diagnosis of ability. Having subjects perform self-affirmation, for example in writing, about a valued trait or accomplishment before performing a task helps to lessen the impact of negative self-evaluation. A final important intervention is to emphasize that intellectual abilities and skills are not innate, but can be acquired.\(^{16}\) For this last, Shapiro and Aronson cite the important work of Carol Dweck.\(^{17}\) Relatedly, Murray Webster and Barbara Sobieszek argue in favor of an interactionist concept of the self; this is the idea that self-concept is relational and results from social interaction. They emphasize that the interactionist conception of self allows individuals to see that their personality and other attributes arise developmentally, rather than being innate. As they observe, many of the studies of self-evaluation «focus on conceptions of abilities rather than opinions»\(^{18}\). Studies of self-evaluations of abilities allows researchers to show how positive evaluations make it more likely that an individual will attempt similar or related tasks or performances in the future, and are more willing to positively evaluate their future performances and to rank themselves highly with respect to ability.\(^{19}\) This research thus underscores the importance of having both confidence and a sense of competence regarding intellectual abilities.

\(^{15}\) Shapiro & Aronson, *Stereotype Threat*, p. 102.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., pp. 106-109.


\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 29.
III. Mentoring and Sponsorship

Mentoring and sponsoring women are among the most important things we can do to help make philosophy more gender balanced. The term mentoring derives from the ancient Greek figure of Mentor, although according to the myth, the goddess Athena assumed the guise of Mentor to help guide Telemachus (perhaps we should call the practice Athenaship to reflect the important role of this goddess)\(^\text{20}\). Margo Murray defines mentoring as «a deliberate pairing of a more skilled or experienced person with a less skilled or experienced one, with the mutually agreed goal of having the less skilled person grow and develop specific competencies»\(^\text{21}\). Mentoring in academia aims to guide those with less experience — in our case, students and early career women — by imparting to them knowledge, practical advice and psychosocial support, and helping them to acquire the social capital that will give them greater visibility. In the corporate environment, mentoring often entails challenging the mentee to take on new tasks before she is ready in order to help her incorporate new ways of thinking or values into her work regimen. In academia, however, we aim to help the mentee to better cultivate her philosophical practice — teaching, research and writing — as well as to set and meet the goals necessary for her to become and remain successful in her career (e.g., getting tenure, promotions, via, for example, publications or professional or administrative leadership). By pairing a mentee with a more experienced mentor, we can both help the former to learn how to cultivate her research and writing skills and to develop the connections that will help her to publish and eventually help to encourage and advance the careers of others. Mentoring has become part of the best practices for faculty development in US universities.

I found it particularly useful to organize mentoring workshops for early career women, and has done so annually since 2012 in conjunction with the annual international Hume conference. The Hume Society announces the workshop and asks potential mentees and men-


\(^{21}\) M. MURRAY, Beyond the myths and the magic of mentoring: How to facilitate an effective mentoring program, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1991, p. XIII.
tors to contact me. Mentees then send in some written work – for example, a thesis chapter or work being prepared for publication – and we identify the most appropriate mentors, based on research areas and the mentors’ strengths in helping the mentee to build a professional network. At the conference, time is set aside for the mentors and mentees to meet on an individual basis to discuss both the particular research sent in and the larger research program. There are also sessions on the concrete goals that must be met to secure a job, tenure and promotion; and on building an international network that remains sensitive to the particular professional requirements of different countries and cultures.

The emphasis on different cultures helps us to identify and address different levels and kinds of sexism throughout the world. For example, at one workshop a Japanese Hume scholar, Haruko Inoue, who is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in philosophy at Oxford, but has been working on Hume’s philosophy for many years, discussed how in Japan she was prohibited from getting a degree in philosophy, and had to get her degree in English. She has found it difficult to participate in academic societies in Japan, but by joining forces and tackling such sexism on a more global scale, we are helping to build an international scholarly profile for her, making it more difficult to exclude her in the academy in Japan. So by coming together to have a more global dialogue, women philosophers who feel isolated in their own cultures can become part of an international network that not only helps to showcase their research, but allows the rest of us to draw on their strengths to help more early career scholars as well as fuel research. Angela Calvo de Saavedra, a philosopher at Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá, Colombia, will now join me in organizing the early career mentoring workshops. We will also now include early career men, recognizing that some scholarly communities, for example, in Latin America, have far fewer resources than their Northern counterparts.

As Catriona MacKenzie and Cynthia Townley rightly point out, restricting mentorship for women to women mentors places a high burden on more senior women; furthermore, pairing mentors and mentees in terms of areas of expertise makes sense in terms of giving the most constructive feedback. See Women In and Out of Philosophy, in Women in Philosophy, pp. 175-177.
Let me give a few examples of how mentoring has led to professional development and success for mentees. One particularly impressive example concerns Annemarie Butler, a professor at Iowa State in the US. Butler participated in a workshop as a mentee paired with senior philosopher Donald Ainslie (Toronto). After the workshop, Ainslie invited Butler to join him in co-editing the *Cambridge Companion to Hume’s Treatise*, an invitation she accepted. Ainslie’s volume had been languishing for ten years due to the burdens he faced chairing the department at Toronto for a number of years. With Butler on board, the volume was quickly and efficiently edited, and is currently in press. Given her status as the editor of a volume, Butler sought out Oxford University Press to propose a series of volumes in early modern philosophy whose contributors will all be women. She is currently in the early stages of editing the first volume in this series, on Hume’s concept of object, to which she has invited both established and early career women philosophers to contribute.

Butler also gave a presentation to a workshop on best strategies to get through the tenure process. She provided a comprehensive bibliography of texts geared towards women in particular and the special hurdles they face in the academy. This proved to be a helpful resource, especially to those in North America, which we will distribute at future workshops. And in 2014 Butler served as a mentor to a young woman whom she subsequently invited to contribute to the new volume she is editing. Other mentees have built their professional networks, with other mentors and allies on whom they will be able to rely for advice, critical reading and editing of work, and letters of recommendation for graduate school, fellowships and academic positions. The mentoring workshops are international in scope; we have had women mentees from four different continents, including Asia and Latin America. Mentors are glad to help out, and the mentees appreciate the attention paid to their work and the opportunity to get advice on their research and expand their professional network. Murray points out that mentoring enhances self-esteem, since one receives recognition for one’s philosophical ability or record, and gains more awareness of one’s ability to help others.
and refine skills in providing constructive feedback. She also observes that mentoring can rekindle one’s own research program\textsuperscript{23}.

Murray distinguishes between mentoring and sponsorship. Caryl Rivers and Rosalind Barnett describe sponsorship as a form of mentoring, one in which the mentor moves beyond giving feedback and organizational advice to actively advocate for the mentee\textsuperscript{24}. Murray summarizes the role of the sponsor as follows: making introductions and network building, letters and other forms of recommendations (in philosophy, this could be for jobs or fellowships, or for publications or conferences – the last two are vital in our efforts to avoid all male lineups in volumes or at conferences), and publicly praising the mentee’s accomplishments. Sponsorship can result in greater confidence and productivity, better career prospects and higher earnings on the part of the mentee\textsuperscript{25}. As Rivers and Barnett suggest, the distinction between mentoring and sponsorship is critical to women’s success. The «Harvard Business Review» article cited below makes the case that «women are over-mentored and under-sponsored relative to their male peers – and so women are not advancing»\textsuperscript{26}. Sponsors tend to be more senior and established, and are thus able to help their mentees advance more easily. Strikingly, according to a 2010 Pew Research Center report, women self-report higher career aspirations than men (66% of women, compared with 59% men): that being successful in a high-paying career or profession is one of the most important or very important aspects of their lives\textsuperscript{27}. In order to combat the new soft war on women, Rivers and Barnett make the following recommendations: get the information you need to succeed: in philosophy this might be about tenure and promotion, publication, and the kind of sponsorship that helps a woman to realize her career aspirations; don’t be a stereotype – clearly implicit bias

\textsuperscript{23} Murray, Beyond the myths and magic of mentoring, pp. 60-62.
\textsuperscript{25} Murray, Beyond the myths and magic of mentoring, pp. 13, 34.
\textsuperscript{27} <http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/04/19/a-gender-reversal-on-career-aspirations>.
and stereotype threat make this difficult, but such interventions as self-affirmation, and receiving constructive mentoring and sponsorship are crucially important; promote yourself; speak up, including expressing anger with an explanation of why you are angry.\(^{28}\)

**IV. Women as Leaders: Inclusion and Advancement**

When women philosophers attain a senior status and national or international profile through their research, they are positioned to exert more authority in the profession. My own experience is a good example: I have served on the Executive Committee and am currently President of the Hume Society, an international scholarly society with about 400 members from six different continents. I have also served as Moral Philosophy Editor for the journal «Hume Studies» (which the Hume Society supports). She is on the journal editorial boards, including the «Journal of Scottish Philosophy» and «Universitas Philosophica» (which is published in Bogotá). As President, I am positioned to invite people to join the Society, as well as to encourage nominations of women for the Executive Committee and for the Editorial Board of «Hume Studies». I have recently instituted a Hume Society policy to provide a stipend to the mentees in the Early Career Mentoring Workshops, as well as stipends for graduate student commentators and chairs at the Hume Society conferences (these measures build on the stipends already given to graduate students who have papers accepted for the conference). These positions also entail decision making, e.g., about conference organizing, special topics or themes that potentially drive new research, including new approaches, methods and subjects in Hume scholarship (so for example, Hume and Feminism was a theme for the conference in Antwerp in 2010, for which I served as a co-director). Senior women have the opportunity to edit volumes, and thus to invite other women to contribute essays. We can reach out to invite women to submit papers to conferences and journals. We can organize conferences and workshops, such as the one in Ferrara that has generated the articles in this special issue of «I Castelli di Yale».

Finally, I think having professional networks for women and their allies can be enormously important in changing the culture. The Society for Women in Philosophy (or SWIP) began in the US, but has branches now in Canada, the UK, Ireland and Germany: the SWIP list has news, announcements and other discussions, but it also hosts an annual conference. FEAST (Feminist Ethics and Social Theory) also hosts an annual conference. Feminist Philosophers is a blog that could be more international in scope, and discusses many issues particular to women in philosophy. There are also writing workshops: WOGAP (Workshop on Gender and Philosophy), founded at MIT around 2000, and its sister organization, BayFAP (Bay Area Workshop on Feminism and Philosophy), which I founded with Ásta Sveinsdottir in San Francisco in 2004. These workshops allow for the circulation and constructive discussion of work in progress.

To conclude: implicit bias continues to be a problem in philosophy; it can be addressed by challenging the views of those expressing it. But it is also important for women themselves to take action to change the culture of our discipline – through mentoring, sponsorship, publication, workshops and conferences. To set an example and provide new models for who is a philosopher and how philosophy is done will, I believe, over time change the face of philosophy.

ABSTRACT. – I discuss three issues: first, a main problem: the implicit biases that disadvantage women philosophers at nearly all stages of their careers as well as the phenomenon of stereotype that can lead women to underperform intellectually; second, the value of mentoring and sponsorship for strategically positioning women to eventually assume leadership roles in philosophy; and third, what women philosophers can do in leadership roles, in particular, including other women and helping to advance their careers.

Cristina Paoletti invited me to participate and speak about women in Hume scholarship at an important workshop held in Ferrara in November 2014. I am very grateful to Cristina and to Federica Russo and Paola Zanardi for the opportunity to speak at that workshop and to hear so many perspectives on how we can change the climate and the career trajectory for women in philosophy.