

# Hegel's analysis of purpose and resolution in the *Science of Logic*

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**Abstract.** *Our purpose is to highlight some essential aspects of Hegel's analysis of what is commonly referred to as "action". Or to be more precise, our purpose is to examine his analysis of some essential components of what might be termed "the thought of action" – and by this, I mean the "thought of action" that is entailed in action itself, and without which there can be no action at all. The essential components we are talking about are those Hegel deals with in the last chapter of the second section of the third book of his Wissenschaft der Logik.*

**Keywords.** Hegel, Action, Science of Logic, Being.

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## 1. Introductory remarks. The complex nature of action. Being, Essence, and Concept. Concept and Objectivity

Our purpose is to highlight some essential aspects of Hegel's analysis of what is commonly referred to as "action". Or to be more precise, our purpose is to examine his analysis of some essential components of what might be termed "the thought of action" – and, by this, I mean the "thought of action" that is *entailed in action itself*, and without which there can be no action at all. The essential components we are talking about are those Hegel deals with in the last chapter of the second section of the third book of his *Wissenschaft der Logik*, namely: "Teleology" (with its three subsections: "A. Subjective end", "B. Means" and "C. Realized end").<sup>1</sup> Or, more precisely, the essential components we are about to examine are those Hegel deals with in the *first* of these subsections.

It has to be admitted that this purpose poses a problem, for there is something basically wrong in trying to isolate a section of Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Any separate consideration of a given part of this book is almost inevitably doomed to be inadequate and seriously distorted. Without the rest of Hegel's analyses, any given section of the *Wissenschaft der Logik* finds itself out of context and pretty much like a fish out of water. And this is even more so in the case of the section we are talking about, since it comes almost *at the end* of the long odyssey of the *Wissenschaft der Logik*, immediately before the advent of what Hegel terms the "Idee". Now, this means that the section we are about to highlight presupposes *almost everything else*, so that this seems to be a case of *putting the cart before the horse* or of *beginning at the end*.

But if one wants to address the above-mentioned problem in a paper, there is no alternative other than leaping *in medias res*, starting literally at the end of the *Wissenschaft der Logik* and leaving out the rest of Hegel's analyses. In short, one must resign oneself to dealing with "a fish out of water" – for this is what happens when one tries, as the saying goes, to squeeze an oversized foot into Cinderella's slipper.

However, in order to make up for this severe shortcoming, we can recall a few essential points. And – given the limitations of space – paying some attention to them is our next best alternative.

First, it must be borne in mind that the shortcoming we are talking about is due to more than just the fact that Hegel's analysis of "action" viz. the above-mentioned subsection on "Subjective end" presupposes almost *everything else* in the *Wissenschaft der Logik*. The problem runs deeper than that. The crux of the matter is that the section we are about to highlight is a *transformation* of everything else, and indeed so much so that *everything else* (the whole preceding chain of developments – *i.e.*, the whole odyssey of the *Wissenschaft der Logik*) is part and parcel of it. In other words, what we are dealing with in the section we are about to highlight is a *result* of everything else: the *whole* chain of preceding developments is, as it were, the very "stuff it is made of". We can also express this by saying that the basic determination of purposiveness (*Zweckmäßigkeit*), as Hegel understands it, is none other than *Sein*, *Wesen*, and *Begriff*, with all they entail (or, to be more precise, that the basic determination of *Zweckmäßigkeit* is the second modality of *Begriff*, namely what Hegel terms *Objektivität*) – and that one misses the point if one does not consider purposiveness (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) in terms of *Sein*, *Wesen* and *Begriff* viz. *Objektivität* (*i.e.*, as a particular kind of *Begriff*, which, as such, presupposes *Wesen*, which in turn presupposes *Sein*). In short, according to Hegel, the very set of determinations he is dealing with when he speaks of *Zweckmäßigkeit* (*i.e.*, what "subjective end", "means" and "realized end" stand for) is such that each and every component of this set of determinations is *in itself* the *tip* of a deeper *iceberg* (and cannot take place without

<sup>1</sup> A. Der subjektive Zweck; B. Das Mittel; C. Der ausgeführte Zweck (Hegel 1981, 154-172).

this deeper iceberg – that is, without the whole in which it is intrinsically embedded).<sup>2</sup> Put another way, both purposiveness (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) and its components (“subjective end”, “means”, and “realized end”) are such that they can only be understood as a “transformed recapitulation” of it all.

And this brings us to a key point: What Hegel viz. the *Wissenschaft der Logik* has to say about “action” (or, as we have put it, about the “thought of action”: the “thought of action” that is entailed in action itself) is, first of all, that action as such cannot be thought of otherwise than as a very complex determination. To begin, it is the very opposite of what Plato termed  $\mu\nu\nu\omicron\epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$ <sup>3</sup> (a single or simple determination, in the fullest sense of the word: an “uni-determined” determination, as it were): it entails a multilayered and intricate network of determinations, all of which are part and parcel viz. conditions *sine quibus non* of “action” as such. Furthermore, it is not even possible to isolate this framework of determinations from everything else (viz. from the essential components of everything else), as if it were a detachable piece of Lego (and everything in “action” as such were uniquely its own). It is rather that the network of determinations “action” stands for has very deep roots, reaching back to the simplest and most elementary determinations, which provide the basis for everything else – so that one can speak, as it were, of multiple tips of a common iceberg.

The second thing that should be noted is the fact that, in Hegel’s view, purposiveness (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) viz. “action” does not mean a particular kind of reality among many others. One can realize that the complex cluster (or network) of determinations “action” (viz. *Zweckmäßigkeit*) stands for is just one of the many “visible parts” of a “common iceberg” and still believe that this particular “tip” of the “common iceberg” is just that, namely a particular kind of reality, so that it has only a limited presence in the middle of everything else – and therefore a limited scope. In other words, we tend to assume that there are many instances of what we call “action” (viz. of what Hegel terms *Zweckmäßigkeit*), but that in the final analysis they form, as it were, an archipelago scattered across what seems to be the ocean of many other things that are neither the source nor the object of any such “action”, so that, apparently, they have nothing whatsoever to do with purposiveness viz. *Zweckmäßigkeit*.

But the *Wissenschaft der Logik* presents a very different view. A single glance at the structure of Hegel’s analysis of what he terms “Objectivity” (*die Objektivität*) and at the internal development of “Objectivity” – namely the one that leads from “Mechanismus” to “Chemismus” and from the latter to “Zweckmäßigkeit” – reveals that he has something altogether different in mind. *Mechanismus* and *Chemismus* are far more than just “regional” realms that can be understood on a purely sectoral basis. In Hegel’s view, *Mechanismus* and *Chemismus* (and, for that matter, each different step in their internal development) stands for the whole realm of reality (or, to be more precise, for the whole realm of what Hegel terms *objectivity*). In each case what is at stake is the entire shape of objectivity (i.e., the shape of all objects). To be sure, as pointed out above, each stage depicted by Hegel (and this also means each step in the internal development of *Mechanismus* and *Chemismus*) amounts to a “transformed recapitulation” of all previous developments. But the point is that at each stage everything is different – and what Hegel has in mind is not partial change, but rather global change. In other words, he depicts a comprehensive, all-embracing multi-stage metamorphosis, each phase of which puts a new complexion on everything, without exception. *Mechanismus*, *Chemismus* (and their various phases of development) stand for different ways of putting together all the different components of

<sup>2</sup> And which is therefore part and parcel of it.

<sup>3</sup> *Phdr.* (78d5, 80b2, 83e2); *Tht.* (205d1); *Symp.* (211b1, 211e4); *Resp.* (612a4); *Ti.* (59b2) – my translation.

objectivity – and this means both a) *different forms of identity for each object* and b) *different forms of connection* (a *different relational network*, as it were) *between non-identical objects*.<sup>4</sup> In short, *Mechanismus* and *Chemismus* (and their various phases of development) stand for *different structures* or *different textures* – one could also say: *a different pattern* or *a different fabric* – of objectivity. And the point is that pretty much the same holds good for *Zweckmäßigkeit* (viz. for “subjective end”, “means” and “realized end”). In this case, too, it is all about a particular way of putting together *all* the different components of objectivity. That is, in this case, too, it is all about a *particular kind of identity for each object* and a *particular kind of connection* (of relational network) *between non-identical objects*. The result being that once *Zweckmäßigkeit* has come about, it is far from standing for an *archipelago* of more or less widely scattered *enclaves*, while everything else remains completely unaffected by it. In fact, quite the reverse is true: once *Zweckmäßigkeit* has come about, *everything* – the whole realm of objectivity, without exception – is transformed by it and bears its imprint. The question is, of course: How?

All this is not to suggest that each of these stages viz. each of these patterns of objectivity (*Mechanismus*, *Chemismus*, *Zweckmäßigkeit* – or, for that matter, each of their phases of development) – is absolutely free from tension, stable and self-enclosed. In fact, as Hegel points out, nothing prevents them from being flawed by unresolved tension, self-contradiction, conceptual impasse, structural failure or aporia.

In Hegel’s view, the stages we are talking about are burdened with their own one-sidedness: there is something *faulty* and *inadequate* about them, and indeed so much so that, in the final analysis, they tend to *transcend* themselves into new frontiers – the result being that they are not *static*, but intrinsically *dynamic*. But this does not change the fact that each stage (each “pattern” – or “fabric” – of objectivity) Hegel refers to is such that it shapes the *whole realm* of objectivity (*i.e.*, each and every object, without exception). And this does not mean just that each and every object in the all-embracing realm of *Mechanismus*, *Chemismus* or *Zweckmäßigkeit* bears their imprint. It also means that if these different models of objectivity give way to further developments, they do so in such a manner that, as pointed out above, all further developments *recapitulate* the whole of the preceding sequence and integrate the specific traits of all previous stages – so that, at the end of the day, *Mechanismus* is “perpetuated” in *Chemismus*, *Chemismus* is “perpetuated” in *Zweckmäßigkeit*, and *Zweckmäßigkeit* is “perpetuated” in the *Idee* – albeit in a “revised and corrected” version of what each of them stands for. In other words, for Hegel, once it has come about, *Zweckmäßigkeit* becomes, as it were, an everlasting possession not only in its own realm (and for all objects within its domain), but indeed for each and every object in all subsequent stages of development.

The third thing that should be noted is the specific sense in which Hegel speaks of *Objektivität* and *Objekt*. This is, of course, a complex matter. But the introductory remarks to section II show what Hegel feels the need to stress in this context. First, as he points out, *Objektivität* has to do with *Begriff*, but in such a way that it stands for *something else*, for something *other* than *Begriff*. It has to do with the transition from *Begriff* to what Hegel terms «the *being in and for itself* of the concept / das an und für sich seiende Sein des Begriffs» (Hegel 1981, 131)<sup>5</sup>: from the *Concept* to its *existence* – that is, to the *Concept’s existence* in what is *other than itself*. In short, *Objektivität* has to do with what might be called the “realization” (the *accomplishment* or *fulfilment*) of *Begriff*. Secondly, *Objektivität* is the *first* and *most elementary* form of the concept’s existence in what is *other than itself*. What is more, this elementary form of the concept’s existence in something other than itself is characterized by *immediacy* viz. by the fact that it is also an *immediate*

<sup>4</sup> The point being, of course, that a) and b) *give rise* to and *presuppose each other*.

<sup>5</sup> We follow Di Giovanni’s translation of Hegel’s *Wissenschaft der Logik* (2010) with slight changes.

form of *Begriff*. It is, as Hegel puts it «the immediacy as which the concept has determined itself by the sublation of its abstraction and mediation / die Unmittelbarkeit, zu der sich der Begriff durch Aufhebung seiner Abstraktion und Vermittlung bestimmt» (Hegel 1981, 130). On the one hand, this means that what Hegel terms *Objektivität* is the product of *Begriff* (it presupposes and entails *Begriff*, it cannot take place without it, it is through and through the *work of the concept*). But, on the other hand, *Objektivität* is a form of *immediacy* (*Unmittelbarkeit*): a *mediated immediacy*, as it were – and this, in turn, means that it conceals its own origin and eclipses, as it were, all mediation viz. the underlying *Begriff*, so that the latter fades into the background and remains completely out of sight.

But this is not all. Hegel emphasizes the double meaning of what he terms *Objektivität*. As he puts it, *Objektivität* denotes both a) standing opposed to the self-subsistent concept (*dem selbständigen Begriffe gegenüberzustehen*), and b) also existing in and for itself (*aber auch das an und für sich Seiende zu sein*) (Hegel 1981, 131) – and this also means being the “main thing” on which everything depends and around which everything revolves. These two meanings seem to go in opposite directions, for the former emphasizes the connection with *Begriff* (opposition to *Begriff* defines the object, and indeed so much so that there is no object without this opposition), while the latter emphasizes the fact the object «Exists in and for itself, without restriction and opposition / das Anundfürsichseiende, das ohne Beschränkung und Gegensatz ist» (Hegel 1981, 131).

Although the two meanings in question seem to be incompatible, what Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik* terms *Objektivität* brings them together. As he points out:

In the former sense, the object stands opposed to the “I=I” which in subjective idealism is declared to be the absolute truth. It is then the manifold world in its immediate existence with which the I or the concept is engaged in an endless struggle, in order, by the negation of the *inherent nullity* of the other, to give to its first certainty of being itself the *actual truth* of its equality with itself (Indem das Objekt in jenem Sinne dem im subjektiven Idealismus als das absolute Wahre ausgesprochenen Ich=Ich gegenübersteht, ist es die mannigfaltige Welt in ihrem unmittelbaren Dasein mit welcher Ich oder der Begriff sich nur in den unendlichen Kampf setzt, um durch die Negation dieses *an sich nichtigen* andern der ersten Gewissheit seiner selbst die *wirkliche Wahrheit* seiner Gleichheit mit sich zu geben). (Hegel 1981, 131)

And he adds: «In a broader sense, it [the object] means a subject matter for whatever interest or activity of the subject / In unbestimmteren Sinne bedeutet es so einen Gegenstand für irgendein Interesse und Tätigkeit des Subjekts» (Hegel 1981, 131).

By and large, Hegel is alluding to the distinctive structure of *Selbstbewusstsein* and its correlate, as described in the corresponding chapter of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. The point is a) that *Selbstbewusstsein* is essentially driven towards self-fulfilment viz. the fullness of itself, so that b) whatever appears to it is *opposed to it*, in such a way that it is characterized by its “otherness” viz. by the fact that it fails to fulfil this fullness, which in turn means that c) whatever appears to *Selbstbewusstsein* has no simple determinations of its own. It appears *within the realm of Selbstbewusstsein*, it comes between *Selbstbewusstsein* and its fullness, and indeed in such a manner that it defines itself by the way in which it *interferes* with *Selbstbewusstsein* and *stands in its way*. In other words, the object has its own density and is irreducible to *Selbstbewusstsein* because it *resists* its drive towards complete self-fulfilment – and the basic determination of any object is how it relates to the agenda of *Selbstbewusstsein*. The object of *Selbstbewusstsein* is all about self-fulfilment or lack thereof – *i.e.*, an object is always a certain state of *Selbstbewusstsein* viz. of its agenda: a state of self-fulfilment or lack thereof, a certain situation or condition on the way to self-fulfilment. This is why Hegel speaks of the object in terms of *interest* and *activity*: a «subject matter for whatever interest or activity of the subject / einen Gegenstand für irgendein Interesse und Tätigkeit des Subjektes». In the *Wissen-*

*schaft der Logik* Hegel speaks of “self” and “concept”, and the point is a) their “agenda” viz. their drive towards self-fulfilment and b) the fact that whatever appears does so in the realm of *Self* and *Concept*, so that it has no simple determination of its own: from the very outset, it is essentially related to *Self* and *Concept* (to the fulfilment of *Self* and *Concept*) and comes between the *Self* viz. *Concept* and their *fullness* – and indeed in such a manner that every object defines itself by the particular way in which it fulfils or fails to fulfil the agenda of *Self* and *Concept*. To be sure, objectivity is, as pointed out above, something *other* than *Begriff* – and indeed so much so that it is *all about this* “otherness”; nevertheless, the fact remains that this “otherness” is intrinsically opposed and therefore related to *Begriff*: from the very outset, it has to do with the realization of *Begriff*; it is the *field for the realization of Begriff*, so that it *presupposes* the latter and is *essentially shaped* by it.

But, on the other hand, none of this prevents the object from having to do with «something existing in and for itself / das an und für sich Seiende» and from being the “main thing”, on which everything depends and around which everything revolves; for, regardless of whether or not its resistance to *Selbstbewusstsein* (or its resistance to what Hegel calls *Self* and *Concept*) must have its origin in some kind of independent existence, the point is that the object can take the form of “something existing in and for itself” (viz. of the “main thing” on which everything depends and around which everything revolves) for another reason: namely because *Selbstbewusstsein* – the *Self* viz. the *Concept* – remains completely *absorbed in its content*; that is, *Selbstbewusstsein* (*Self* viz. *Concept*) can be “taken up” with its content (or get “carried away” with it), and indeed so much so that it fails to notice itself (the underlying *Self*, the underlying *Concept*) viz. the fact that the object is *essentially self-related* and *concept-related*. Put another way, the object can take the form of the “main thing” and of “something existing in and for itself” because of an *eclipse of the Self* viz. *of the Concept* – not in the sense that the latter cease to be there or to play a leading role, but because they remain *unnoticed*. We can also say that the object in the above-mentioned sense conceals the ‘umbilical cord’ connecting it to the *Concept* viz. to the *Self*. To be sure, the *Concept* viz. the *Self* is and remains the “main thing” on which everything depends and around which everything revolves; and the basic determination of every object is and remains *essentially self-related* and *concept-related*, so that the Object is all about the *Self*’s viz. the *Concept*’s agenda (about its fulfilment or the lack thereof, etc.). But the continuous reference to the *Self* viz. to the *Concept* remains *inconspicuous*. The result being that the *Self* viz. the *Concept* a) forgets itself and b) forgets that in the final analysis it is all about the *Self* viz. the *Concept* and c) forgets that the object is but *the Concept in the guise of something completely independent of it*. In short, *Selbstbewusstsein* – the *Self* viz. the *Concept* – can remain unnoticed and thereby play the role of a “grey eminence” operating behind the scenes. And this is what objectivity in the sense Hegel is referring to is all about.

Now, it is important to bear this in mind not only because *purposiveness* (“subjective end, means and realized end”) is a particular kind of objectivity in this sense, but also because, in Hegel’s view, it marks the *turning point* from objectivity in this sense to something else – that is, the *border* between the *Concept* as a “grey eminence” – the concept *incognito* or what Hegel terms «The concept’s state of unfreedom, its being *sunk into externality* / die Unfreiheit desselben, sein Versenktsein in die Äußerlichkeit» (Hegel 1981, 155) – and the “coming forward” of the *Concept* (its *making itself known as concept*). In other words, *Zweckmäßigkeit* (subjective end, means and realized end) is more than just *another component* of objectivity (viz. just *another stage* in its development). In Hegel’s view, *Zweckmäßigkeit* is set apart by the fact that it leads to a *surmounting of objectivity* in the above mentioned sense. According to the *Wissenschaft der Logik*, it marks the threshold at which the concept *ceases to stay in the shadow, makes itself known, and*

openly assumes the leading role it has been quietly playing, so that it takes centre stage or becomes the focal point. In other words, according to the *Wissenschaft der Logik*, *Zweckmäßigkeit* is the inaugural form of the *concept acting as itself*. And this is a further reason why *Zweckmäßigkeit* is anything but a detail: In Hegel's view, it is a milestone in the discovery of the Concept and indeed the key to nothing less than the emergence of what he terms the *Idea*.

## 2. A closer look at Objectivity. *Mechanismus*, *Chemismus* and *Zweckmäßigkeit*

But we are jumping ahead and must step back. If we want to get some insight on what the *Wissenschaft der Logik* has to say about *Zweckmäßigkeit* or *purposiveness* (and in particular about *purpose* and *resolution*) we need to take into consideration another aspect – or rather a few aspects, namely a) the “tension” that, in Hegel's view, pervades objectivity and b) the criteria according to which all the different forms of *Mechanismus* and *Chemismus* are “weighed in the balance and found wanting”, c) the pattern change *Mechanismus* and *Chemismus* (viz. their various stages of development) stand for, and d) the main directions in the development of objectivity, from the simplest form of *Mechanismus* to *Zweckmäßigkeit*.

As pointed out above, it has all to do both with *different forms of identity for each object* and with *different forms of connection* (a different *relational network*, as it were) *between non-identical objects* – the point being that these two components *give rise to and presuppose each other* (so that, in the final analysis, they are but *one*). But this description is too vague. We need to be more specific and describe what kind of *pattern change* Hegel is referring to when he speaks of *Mechanismus* and *Chemismus* viz. of their various stages of development. Or, put another way: What kind of “analysis grid” are we dealing with here? Which are the main issues and challenges that play a pivotal role in these pages – the *guidelines* or *guiding principles*, as it were, that shape Hegel's analytical work on objectivity, as laid down in the *Wissenschaft der Logik*?

First, it should be borne in mind that, according to Hegel, in the whole realm of objectivity there are no self-enclosed objects: everything defines itself by a certain kind of connection with everything else. What is more, from the very beginning Hegel's analysis of objectivity stresses the *interaction* between different objects (the fact that they *act* on one another and *influence* each other), and indeed so much so that *interaction*<sup>6</sup> (viz. the way different patterns of interaction go hand in hand with different patterns for the identity of each object and for the relational network between non-identical objects) is, as it were, the *Leitmotif* of his analysis. But the fact that from the very beginning every object defines itself by a certain kind of connection with everything else does not prevent the possibility of this connection remaining relatively *loose*. In Hegel's view, this is precisely what characterizes *Mechanismus* (and also, even if to a lesser extent, *Chemismus*), so that the path from the most elementary forms of *Mechanismus* to *Zweckmäßigkeit* has to do with the *increasing degree of connection between everything and everything else* viz. with the fact that this connection becomes much closer in *Chemismus* and in *Zweckmäßigkeit* (or, for that matter, in each stage of development of all three varieties of objectivity).

But the question is *how*. Let us start with what Hegel expresses by saying in his description of *Mechanismus* that «Nowhere is a principle of self-determination to be found / Es ist (...) nirgend ein Prinzip der Selbstbestimmung vorhanden» (Hegel 1981, 135). *Self-determination* (*Selbstbestimmung*) is the distinctive feature of *Begriff*. And this means that – in the realm of *Mechanismus* – the *Begriff* does not show itself as itself.

<sup>6</sup> *Aufeinanderwirken, Einwirkung aufeinander*, and the like.

First, at the most elementary level of *Mechanismus* every object is determined by something other than itself. Its determinateness is outside and beyond itself – and this also means that every object is in itself completely indifferent to its own determinateness. In other words, no determination is in and for itself; no determination is an *originary determination* (Hegel 1981, 137); everything is *bloßes Gesetzsein*: mere positedness (Hegel 1981, 137). For each and every object it is a matter of utter indifference that *it is as it is* and *behaves the way it behaves*. That is, all determinations have a *purely accidental relation to themselves*. Each object *happens to be* what is – and this is all there is to it. *Nothing is absolutely required*, and in this sense *nothing is essential*. For all objects their own determinateness is a *contingency*: they are *self-external* and *accidental to themselves*. And all this in such a way that the *externality* – the *unessentiality*, the *contingency*, and *indifference* – we are talking about is a feature not only of each object, but indeed of the whole framework of objectivity. But then, again, the path from *Mechanismus* to *Zweckmäßigkeit* has to do both with an *increasing degree of self-determination* and with an *increasing degree of essentiality*. In other words, the development of objectivity, as Hegel describes it, brings about new kinds of determinacies viz. of objects that are *intrinsically rooted in themselves* viz. that prove to be in an *internal connection between themselves and themselves*, thanks to which each of them *requires itself* and therefore turns out to be *essential, non-contingent* and *non-indifferent*.

Secondly, pretty much the same holds true for the connection between non-identical objects and for their *interaction* (their *Einwirkung aufeinander*) – which, as pointed out above, plays a major role in Hegel's analysis. The pattern changes the development from *Mechanismus* to *Zweckmäßigkeit* is all about has to do with the transition from what might be described as an *external, inessential and indifferent Wirkung* to the very opposite. In the beginning (in the most elementary forms of *Mechanismus*) interaction is just an «external – and empty – back and forth movement / das äußerliche, leere Hin- und Hergehen» (Hegel 1981, 135). But the structural development of objectivity also has to do with change in this regard. On the one hand, both the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of *Wirkung* become less and less indifferent to the interaction they have with each other; and we can speak a) of an *increasing content-relatedness* of interaction and b) of an *increasing differentiation* of *what plays what role* and *how one thing interacts* with another. On the other hand, interaction also becomes more essential in the sense that both its *terminus a quo* and its *terminus ad quem* become *less and less peripheral* to the core of each object: interaction viz. change is increasingly prompted by *the very core* of its *terminus a quo* and increasingly affects *the very core* of its *terminus ad quem*, so that the path from *Mechanismus* to *Zweckmäßigkeit* is a path in which *essential change* (the opposite of what Hegel describes as «a *superficial, transient alteration* / eine oberflächliche transiente Veränderung» (Hegel 1981, 139) plays a growing role.

A third aspect concerns the *scope of interaction* viz. *Wirkung*. In the most elementary forms of *Mechanismus* there is nothing but *partial interaction*: more or less *scattered* and *loose threads* of interaction, here and there. At this stage in its development, *Mechanismus* stands for an *open field* of possible “lines” of interaction – and the reason why we can speak of an *open field* is precisely the fact that in the end which parts of the whole field are engaged in interaction remains open (and in Hegel's terminology *zufällig*). But one of the main axes of development in the path from *Mechanismus* to *Chemismus* and *Zweckmäßigkeit* has to do with the fact that a) at least some components of objectivity turn out to play a determining role on *all* others, and b) the broadening and intensification of this kind of connection between various objects (viz. various components of objectivity) points in the direction of nothing less than some kind of *global interaction*, in which *everything* is somehow involved in *everything else*, the result being what might be described as *the full opposite of mere juxtaposition* (and this in turn means the *complete broadening*

and the *utmost intensification of essential interaction or essential change*, in the above mentioned sense).

This leads us to a fourth aspect, namely the fact that the pattern change we are talking about also concerns the role played by *universality, particularity and singularity* (*Allgemeinheit, Besonderheit* and *Einzelheit*). From the very outset all three play a significant role, and indeed in a certain connection with each other. But Hegel describes the transition from *Mechanismus* to *Zweckmäßigkeit* in terms of a change from mere “coexistence” (the fact that universality, particularity and singularity *are there*, as essential components of objectivity, each of them playing its own role) – or rather from a state of *separateness* and *conflict* between them – to what might be described as an *increasing integration of all three*: the particular ceases to be just the opposite of the universal, it takes a shape in which it becomes *itself an instance* and an *expression* of the universal; while, conversely, the latter ceases to be just the opposite of the particular (or, for that matter of the singular) and takes a shape in which it leads straight to them<sup>7</sup>, so that the particular viz. the singular becomes part and parcel of its own (namely the universal's) intrinsic development. In short, the path from *Mechanismus* to *Zweckmäßigkeit* is not least a path *towards increasing permeation and interpenetration* between *universality, particularity and singularity*.

But this is not all. Another main axis of the pattern change we are talking about has to do with the gradually increasing role of what might be termed the *prescriptive component*. Interaction becomes more than just the spreading or dissemination of something *already there*. In the most elementary stage of *Mechanismus* «The product is the same as the object that first enters the process / Sonach ist das Produkt dasselbe was das in den Prozeß erst eingehende Objekt» (Hegel 1981, 139). There is no *prescriptive component*. But in the final stage of *Mechanismus* – namely when interaction takes the form of what Hegel terms “the law” (*das Gesetz*) – this prescriptive component is already present. And the point is that it plays an even greater part in the realm of *Chemismus*, and indeed so much so that the main structural development of *Chemismus* revolves mostly around this point. In the realm of *Chemismus* the object is constituted in such a way that *it intensifies its relation* both a) *with other objects* and b) *with itself*, the result being that it starts *prescribing (anticipating and requiring)* both c) *a new version of other objects* (viz. a new version of its *connection* with other objects) and d) *a new version of itself*. In other words, *tension towards something other than what is already there – i.e. tension towards something required* that is not yet there – takes the leading role. The objects viz. their connection with each other *tend to something else*: to an *ideal double* or *Doppelgänger* of what is already there – to what might be described as “idem sed aliter”, not in the sense of mere *dissemination* of the very same contents, but rather in the sense of *new contents or determinacies* (i.e., of some kind of *innovation* in this regard). In short, the “old” is constituted in such a way that it entails a “program” or “recipe” for something *new*. And this is why Hegel can stress both a) that in this case the product is not «the same as the object that first enters the process» and b) that, contrary to what happens in the mechanical process, in the realm of *Chemismus* (and indeed in the realm of *purpose*) the result is «already there ahead of that process itself / schon vor ihm selbst vorhanden»: «Its end is in its beginning / sein Ende ist (...) in seinem Anfang» (Hegel 1981, 139-140).

To be sure, these two ways of describing what we have termed the *prescriptive component* seem to be contradictory. But on closer inspection it turns out that there is no contradiction at all. On the one hand, Hegel is stressing the fact that the prescriptive component goes hand in hand with *real innovation* – with *new contents*, with the advent

<sup>7</sup> The form of what Hegel terms «a universality that *particularizes itself from within* / eine Allgemeinheit, die sich *an ihr selbst besondert*» (Hegel 1981, 142).

of something *different* from “the object that first enters the process”. On the other hand, he is emphasizing that at the heart of this prescriptive component we are talking about is the *anticipation* of an *ideal* content: the new contents are already there ahead of the process itself – namely *in anticipation* (and only in anticipation)<sup>8</sup>: as *ideal* contents (not as something already *vorhanden*). We can also express this by saying that the prescriptive component we are talking about foreshadows the idea of some kind of *Sollen* – of an “ought” or quasi-“ought” – «to which that external reality does not correspond / *welcher jene äußerliche Realität nicht entspricht*» (Hegel 1981, 145). And the point is a) that, in Hegel’s view, *Chemismus* differs from *Mechanismus* not least because this *Sollen* (this “ought” or quasi-“ought”) is its driving force, and b) the structural development of *Chemismus* is all about the growing role played by this *Sollen* (this “ought” or quasi-“ought”).

Furthermore the increasing role played by the *prescriptive* component viz. by the quasi-*Sollen* is closely associated with the transition from purely “exogenous” interaction (change prompted by other objects: something acting upon something else, so that the latter is *changed from outside*) to “endogenous” change and in particular to what Hegel terms *Streben* (striving) and *Trieb* (impulse) (Hegel 1981, 143-144, 147, 149-150). The pattern of objectivity *Chemismus* stands for is all about *Streben* and what Hegel terms a *gespannte Objektivität* (tense objectivity) (Hegel 1981, 147). The object is by nature *in tension* (*durch seine Natur selbst gespannt*) (Hegel 1981, 147), and objectivity takes the form of a *tension field*: the tension field of *striving*. Or, to be more precise: a) *Chemismus* is all about *contradiction*, namely “the contradiction of” the object’s «immediate positedness and its immanent individual concept / *der Widerspruch seines unmittelbaren Gesetzseins und seines immanenten individuellen Begriffs*» (Hegel 1981, 147); and b) the *Streben* Hegel is talking about is «the *striving* to sublimate the immediate determinateness of its existence and to give concrete existence to the objective totality of the concept / *ein Streben, die Bestimmtheit seines Daseins aufzuheben und der objektiven Totalität des Begriffs die Existenz zu geben*» (Hegel 1981, 147). Put another way, *Chemismus* is all about the objects being *tensed* not only *against each other* but indeed *against themselves*.

In short, *Chemismus* is about the objects being *tensed* against “*das Vorhandene*” – i.e., against their “immediate positedness” (*unmittelbares Gesetzsein*): against the “determinateness of their existence” (*die Bestimmtheit ihres Daseins*). Or the distinctive trait of *Chemismus* is, as Hegel also puts it, that the object “stands through its concept in contradiction” both a) “to its concrete existence’s own one-sidedness” (*durch seinen Begriff im Widerspruch gegen die eigene Einseitigkeit seiner Existenz*) and b) to “the one-sidedness of the other” (*die Einseitigkeit des anderen*): the one-sidedness of other objects. The “chemical object” is *tensed* against this one-sidedness. And because it strives to sublimate it, this kind of object has, as it were, its *own in-built dynamics*. And this is why we can say that the pattern of objectivity *Chemismus* stands for is characterized by the culmination of the “self-igniting movement” (*sich selbst entzündende Bewegung*) (Hegel 1981, 146) that, according to Hegel, makes its appearance in the higher forms of *Mechanismus*. And this in turn provides some insight into the connection between the concept-related (viz. the quasi-*Sollen*-related) *Streben* we are talking about and *self-determination* (*Selbstbestimmung*): according to Hegel, the chemical object initiates the *process* – namely the chemical process – as a self-determining (*und den Prozeß selbstbestimmend anfängt*) (Hegel 1981, 149).

Finally, this leads us to the connection between all this and the protagonist role played by *Begriff*. We have just seen that both the *prescriptive* component and what Hegel calls

<sup>8</sup> Because what is already there *tends* towards them.

*Streben* are essentially concept-related. Let us consider, for example, the following passage:

Indem es auf diese Weise *an sich* der ganze Begriff ist, so hat es an ihm selbst die *Notwendigkeit* und den *Trieb*, sein entgegengesetztes, *einseitiges Bestehen* aufzuheben und sich zu dem *realen Ganzen* im Dasein zu machen, welches es seinem Begriff nach ist / Since in this way the object is *in itself [implicitly]* the whole concept, it has within it the *necessity* and the *impulse* to sublimate its opposed, one-sided subsistence, and to bring itself in existence to the *real whole* which it already is according to its concept. (Hegel 1981, 148)

As Hegel himself points out, everything revolves around the concept. And the difference between *Mechanismus* and *Chemismus* (and, for that matter, the difference between the various stages in *Chemismus*) results to a large extent from the fact that the concept becomes more and more *apparent* and more and more *important*<sup>9</sup> – and that its *structure* (viz. the distinctive features of the concept as such) shines more and more through each new pattern of objectivity. In other words, the pattern of objectivity becomes more clearly *concept-related* – and, what is more, the key determinations become, as it were, *concept-like*: they take the shape of *quasi-concepts*.<sup>10</sup> Quasi-concepts emerge both as the determining factor in *interaction* between non-identical objects and as the determining factor in the *identity of each object*. Both the former and the latter have to do, as Hegel puts it, with «a determinateness posited by the concept / eine durch den Begriff gesetzte Bestimmtheit» (Hegel 1981, 147). That is, both interaction between non-identical objects and the identity of each object have a *quasi-concept* either as their matrix or as their *terminus a quo* viz. *terminus ad quem* – and indeed so much so that *self-determination* (*Selbstbestimmung*) and quasi-conceptual “anticipation” or “projection” of ideal (not yet existing) contents becomes the pivotal factor. But this is not all; for, in addition, the unfolding of objectivity (and in particular the structural development of *Chemismus*) is also characterized by the fact that the *opposition* and *tension* between the quasi-concept and what is already there (and the drive to «unite the concept [or rather the quasi-concept] with its reality in conclusion / seinen Begriff mit seiner Realität zusammen[zuschließen]»<sup>11</sup> becomes more and more obvious – with the result that the quasi-concept (and through it the “hidden work” of the concept itself) acquires increased “visibility”.

This rough overview enables us to see the specificity of Hegel’s approach and what is at stake in his analysis of the structural development of what he terms “objectivity”. It is all about different ways of *increasing* and *intensifying the interconnection* and *interpenetration* among all the different components of “objectivity” (all the different determinations that enter its composition and put it together). In other words, it is all about *more*

<sup>9</sup> Or rather, *ostensibly* important.

<sup>10</sup> It makes sense to speak of *quasi-concepts* for, on the one hand, what we are dealing with here is constituted in such a way that a) from the very outset it has a *conceptual nature* and b) as pointed out above, the distinctive features viz. the particular structure of the concept shine through it, but, on the other hand, c) the underlying concept remains *hidden* or, as Hegel puts it, *in die Äußerlichkeit versenkt* (*sunk into externality*: Hegel 1981, 155) and is anything but an *unfettered* concept or “der Begriff in freier Existenz” viz. “der Begriff selbst in seiner Existenz” (*ibid.*). In other words, if we consider the superior forms of objectivity in the realm of *Mechanismus* and *Chemismus*, we see that in their case what appears on the stage of objectivity is already something *strikingly resembling a concept* (and even bearing *the utmost similarity* to what characterizes a concept as such), but in such a manner that, nevertheless, the concept as such does not make its appearance on the stage of objectivity, *acting openly as itself*.

<sup>11</sup> To paraphrase Hegel’s words where he writes: «(...) und dadurch sich in eine Mitte gibt, durch welche es seinen Begriff mit seiner Realität zusammenschließt (...)» (1981, 152).

“threads” and *closer spacing* of the “threads” – about *tightening* and *strengthening* the network viz. the “weave” of the object. The *scale is refined* from coarse to fine: the “shuttle” weaving back and forth increases the *number* and *directions* of its movements and moves in a *more differentiated manner* between *more differentiated* components – in such a way that it tends towards what might be described as *intense interrelations between everything and everything else* (i.e. between each and every component of objectivity). In short, to use a metaphor from Lichtenberg, it is all about developing the “domestic trade” among all the different components of objectivity.<sup>12</sup> The result being that they all become bound together more closely and strongly, so that “objectivity” becomes *more complex, more firmly woven, denser and thicker* – and *gains*, as it were, *consistency*.

But, having said all this, it should be noted that this rough overview of the path from *Mechanismus* to *Zweckmäßigkeit* leaves out something essential, and indeed so much so that it runs the risk of missing the whole point. Hegel does not limit himself to describing the unfolding of objectivity as a change from lack of self-determination to self-determination, from “inessentiality”, externality and indifference to essentiality and non-indifference, from inessential change to essential change, from limited to global interaction, from separateness and conflict among universality, particularity and singularity to their increasing permeation and interpenetration, etc. As a matter of fact, he is at pains to show that the *intermediate levels* in this process (and in particular all the various forms of *Mechanismus* and *Chemismus*) are *insufficient*: they *do not go far enough* in these different directions – and, on closer inspection, it turns out that in fact *they leave much to be desired*. Hegel’s point is that, despite all the pattern change we have been talking about, *Mechanismus* and *Chemismus* do not eradicate the prevalence of externality, the prevalence of *Zufälligkeit*, the prevalence of the lack of self-determination, the prevalence of separateness and conflict among universality, particularity and singularity, etc. In other words, Hegel’s point is that, in the final analysis, despite all change, *externality* and *inessentiality* maintain the upper hand over essentiality, *Gesetzsein* (*positedness*) – the lack of self-determination – maintains the upper hand over *self-determination*, separateness and conflict among universality, particularity and singularity maintain the upper hand over their permeation and interpenetration, the eclipse of the concept maintains the upper hand over its making itself known – and so on, and so forth.

We can also express this by saying that, in Hegel’s view, the whole process leading from *Mechanismus* to *Chemismus* does not go beyond what might be described as a *less external externality* (but *externality nonetheless*), a *less zufällige Zufälligkeit* (but *Zufälligkeit nonetheless*), and so on and so forth.

And this is where, in Hegel’s view, *Zweckmäßigkeit* (purposiveness: “subjective end, means and realized end”) has a key role to play. And it has a key role to play because, however great the similarity between the higher forms of *Chemismus* and *Zweckmäßigkeit*, there are still decisive differences between them. In other words, it is pretty obvious that some important traits of the higher forms of *Chemismus* come very near to the distinctive features of *Zweckmäßigkeit*. But there is still a *world of difference* between them – and indeed so much so that a *minimum* of *Zweckmäßigkeit* or purposiveness represents an extraordinary leap *ahead* of *Chemismus* and everything it stands for. In Hegel’s view, *Zweckmäßigkeit* takes objectivity to a whole new level – and its advent means nothing short of a groundbreaking *pattern change*. What is more, his point is

<sup>12</sup> «Wenn ich doch Kanäle in meinem Kopf ziehen könnte, um den inländischen Handel zwischen meinem Gedankenvorrat zu befördern! Aber da liegen sie zu Hunderten, ohne einander zu nützen. / If only I could open channels in my head, in order to promote the inner trade among my stores of thoughts! But alas, there they lie by the hundreds, without being useful to one another» (*Sudelbücher* K 30, in: Lichtenberg 1971, 402).

that *Zweckmäßigkeit* takes the unfolding of objectivity to a whole new level in all the above-mentioned axes of development. And the upshot of all this is that, in the final analysis, the difference between the higher forms of *Chemismus* and *Zweckmäßigkeit* turns out to be more important than the said similarity between them. Here, too, Aby Warburg's motto «Der liebe Gott steckt im Detail / God is in the details» proves to be judicious.<sup>13</sup> At the end of the day, one main reason why the similarity between the higher forms of *Chemismus* and *Zweckmäßigkeit* is important is the fact that it provides a foil to the contrast and sharpens our view of the specific nature of *Zweckmäßigkeit* (viz. of the difference between the quasi-concept and concept itself coming out of its 'shell' – or, as Hegel puts it: «The concept emerging as determined in and for itself, a totality unconditioned by externality»<sup>14</sup>).

### 3. Hegel's preliminary remarks on *Zweckmäßigkeit*

Let us now turn our attention to Hegel's analysis of "subjective end". This analysis is preceded by some remarks on teleology. Of course, this is not the place to examine them in any detail. But there are two important aspects that have to be addressed here, for they define the framework and scope of purposiveness (*Zweckmäßigkeit*). The first concerns what might be described as the main limitation of *Zweckmäßigkeit* (its "Achilles heel" or "stumbling block", as it were), owing to which it does not go far beyond objectivity and is but a new form of objectivity or a superior stage in its development. The second aspect goes in the opposite direction: it has to do with the formidable leap that *Zweckmäßigkeit* represents viz. with the fact that it provides an extraordinary springboard for overcoming objectivity, if only in an inchoate way. Or, to put it in Platonic terms, the former is like the leaden weight that drags *Zweckmäßigkeit* downwards (*Resp.* 519a-b), whereas the latter resembles the wings that enable it to reach very far and very high (*Phdr.* 246-256) – the point being that purposiveness is characterized both by the fact that, as the French put it, "elle a du plomb dans l'aile" and by the fact that it nevertheless has the strength to lift the weight and be the raising of the curtain for something absolutely new.

Let us start with the former aspect, namely with the "weak spot" of purposiveness. According to Hegel, it has mainly to do with two essential features.

First, *Zweckmäßigkeit* is constituted in such a way that it is essentially related to a heterogeneous element. All purposiveness takes as its starting point "simple objectivity" in the aforementioned sense. That is, the manifoldness of objects it is essentially related to remains something externally given (something «externally determined and indifferent to its being determined»<sup>15</sup>). To be sure, changing this manifoldness of objects is what purposiveness is all about. It nevertheless remains true that this heterogeneous element is part and parcel of purposiveness as such, so that in a way purposiveness remains intrinsically linked to the very thing it is supposed to overcome – the result being that, where there is some room for purposiveness, the very fact that there remains some room for it shows that there continues to be a certain amount of something "immediate" viz. of something "externally determined and indifferent to its being determined". Hegel writes:

<sup>13</sup> Apparently these words served as a motto for his 1925 seminar «Die Bedeutung der Antike für den stilistischen Wandel in der italienischen Kunst der Frührenaissance». See notably Wutke (1990), Mastroiani (2000), Schäffner & Weigel *et al.* (2003).

<sup>14</sup> «(...) woraus der Begriff als an und für sich bestimmte und von der Äußerlichkeit nicht bedingte Totalität hervorgeht» (Hegel 1981, 153).

<sup>15</sup> "(...) ein solches Objekt, ein äußerlich bestimmtes und gegen solches Bestimmtwerden gleichgültiges (...)" (Hegel 1981, 155).

Indem er [namely: der Zweck] selbst noch innerhalb der Sphäre der Objektivität oder der Unmittelbarkeit des totalen Begriffs steht, ist er von der Äußerlichkeit als solcher noch affiziert und hat eine objektive Welt sich gegenüber, auf die er sich bezieht. / Inasmuch as it still stands inside the sphere of objectivity or of the immediacy of the total concept, it is still affected by externality as such and has an objective world over against it to which it refers. (Hegel 1981, 159)

But this is not all. Secondly, *purposiveness* (“subjective end, means, and realized end”) is such that nothing prevents whatever plays the role of a subjective aim from being *trivial, finite* and *insignificant* (Hegel 1981, 156) – that is, *not really essential*. In other words, the purposes that *Zweckmäßigkeit* espouses are, as the case may be, more important or more trivial; but, in the final analysis, they can remain *external* and therefore *contingent*. Nothing prevents their *content* (and this means: the *content* of *Zweckmäßigkeit*) from being, as Hegel puts it, «something given to it in the manifoldness of the objective world» (Hegel 1981, 156)<sup>16</sup> viz. of what we have termed “simple objectivity”. We can also express this by saying that subjective purposiveness can have as its content “those very determinations” that are also “the content of objectivity” *prior to the advent of purposiveness*, with the sole difference that prior to the advent of purposiveness they are there «as something external and accidental / als ein Äußerliches, Zufälliges», whereas purposiveness makes them play the role of something essential and non-indifferent (Hegel 1981, 156). In short, nothing prevents purposiveness from being just a change of pattern *concerning the form*, while everything else (namely the *contents*) *remains the same* – that is, something *external* and *accidental*. In which case, as far as *contents* are concerned, the change produced by purposiveness is a change from what is itself inessential and indifferent to something *no less inessential and indifferent*, but which nevertheless is called to play the role of the *essential* and *important* – a role which a) is introduced solely by the *form* of purposiveness, and b) does not become the contents that are called to play it (for, in the final analysis, there is no intrinsic connection between them and the fact that they are called to play this role, so that the contents in question turn out to be “simple objectivity” *in the guise of purposiveness* or *immediacy in the guise of self-determination*).

These two major limiting factors are counteracted by another essential feature of *Zweckmäßigkeit*, namely the fact that, as we have pointed out, from the very beginning its *form* goes far beyond its contents. As far as its *form* is concerned, purposiveness is all about «a concept, something determined in and for itself and consequently self-determined / ein *an und für sich Bestimmtes* und damit Selbstbestimmendes» (Hegel 1981, 156). But the purposes (*i.e.*, the contents) that purposiveness espouses «contradict what they are supposed to be».<sup>17</sup>

The important thing about purposiveness is thus its *form*: the very *form* as such. The form is, as it were, the core, the “torch bearer” and the “leading edge” of purposiveness:

The content of concept, since the latter is thereby posited as something formal, is for teleology also externally given to it in the manifoldness of the objective world – in those very determinacies that are also the content of mechanism, but are there as something external and accidental. Because of this commonality of content, only the form of purposiveness constitutes by itself the essential element of the teleological. / Indem der Begriff hierdurch als ein Formelles gesetzt ist, so ist ihr [der Zweckmäßigkeit] der Inhalt auch ein ihm äußerlich in der Mannigfalt-

<sup>16</sup> « (...) ein ihm äußerlich in der Mannigfaltigkeit der objektiven Welt Gegebenes (...)» (Hegel 1981, 156).

<sup>17</sup> «Wenn dieser [der Inhalt] aber sonst ein endlicher und unbedeutender ist, so widerspricht er dem, was er sein soll (...)» (Hegel 1981, 156).

tigkeit der objektiven Welt Gegebenes, – in eben jenen Bestimmtheiten, welche auch Inhalt des Mechanismus, aber als ein Äußerliches, Zufälliges sind. Um dieser Gemeinschaftlichkeit willen macht die *Form der Zweckmäßigkeit* für sich allein das Wesentliche des Teleologischen aus. (Hegel 1981, 156-157)

But the reason why the form of purposiveness is this important is not least the fact that in a way it prescribes the kind of content that would be a match for it – and thereby gives rise to the above mentioned *tension* or *contradiction between form and content*. And, what is more, purposiveness is precisely characterized by the fact that it *gives importance to content* and is in fact *all about content*: «In teleology, (..) the content becomes important, for teleology presupposes a concept, something determined in and for itself and consequently self-determining (...) / In der Teleologie (...) wird der Inhalt wichtig, weil sie einen Begriff, ein *an und für sich Bestimmtes* und damit Selbstbestimmendes voraussetzt (...)» (Hegel 1981, 156). Or to be more precise, purposiveness is all about the *content* in the sense that it is all about the very opposite of *Zufälligkeit* (of “inessential”, insignificance, contingency, randomness and the like). Purposiveness is all about the *negation* and *exclusion* of all this viz. about a *content* that is diametrically *opposed to all this* and proves *able to exclude all this*. In short, purposiveness is precisely characterized by the fact that in it *content becomes essential (wesentlich wird)* (Hegel 1981, 156), in the double sense that it takes centre stage and that this *Wesentlich werden* becomes, as it were, the “root of the matter” – the thing around which everything revolves. And this in turn means that, even if the purposes it espouses are *zufällig* (inessential, insignificant, finite and contingent), purposiveness is constituted in such a way that, as far as its *form* is concerned (and without this form there is no purposiveness in the first place), it goes far beyond all inessential, insignificant, finite and contingent purposes. In other words, no matter how finite and contingent the concrete purposes may be, the very *form* of purposiveness *directs all purposiveness toward something else* – namely the essential, *das nicht Gleichgültige* – so that inessential contents can function as purposes only insofar as they play the role of this *something else*, that is, only insofar as they “impersonate” the essential viz. *das Nichtgleichgültige* which is the permanent correlate (the correlate *sine quo non*) of the form of purposiveness.

But this is not all. More importantly, the form of purposiveness is such that it prompts the kind of tension Hegel expresses by saying: «(...) for according to its form purpose is a totality infinite within itself / (...) denn der Zweck ist seiner Form nach eine in sich unendliche Totalität (...)» (Hegel 1981, 156). One might think that what he is referring to here is a distinctive trait of what might be termed the teleological frame of mind (a particular variety of theoretical model). But on close inspection it turns out that it is rather an *intrinsic component of all purposiveness as such*.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Incidentally, it should be borne in mind that there is both a crucial *difference* and an essential *connection* between a) *Zweckmäßigkeit* as *purposiveness* and b) *Zweckmäßigkeit* as *teleological explanation*. In his preliminary remarks Hegel speaks of both. But the former is the primary object of his analysis. The latter is a variety of *explanation* – not of purposiveness as such. In other words, what is usually termed “teleology” (teleological connections and the like) is a particular kind of *explanation* (of *causal explanation*). This particular kind of causal explanation stands out because it resorts to the idea of *Zweckmäßigkeit*. *Zweckmäßigkeit* in this *derived* sense (*i.e.*, teleological *explanation*) is a *hybrid*: it combines typical features of *purposiveness* as such, that is of the original form of *Zweckmäßigkeit* (and in particular the specific framework of sense-making *Zweckmäßigkeit* is all about) and typical features of *explanation* – viz. of *causal explanation* – as such (say, its “retrospective” character, etc.). It cannot be too strongly emphasized that: a) what Hegel is referring to in chapter III is not primarily *Zweckmäßigkeit* in the sense of teleological *explanation* (a particular kind of causal *explanation*), b) *Zweckmäßigkeit* as a particular kind of causal *explanation* (as a specific *explanatory principle* or *explanatory model*) has a *derived character* and is intrinsically embed-

The point is that the very *form* of *Zweckmäßigkeit* raises the question of essentiality in the above mentioned sense viz. the question of overcoming *Zufälligkeit* and *Äußerlichkeit* (“inessentiality”, “externality” and the like). That is, the new *view* (the new pattern, the new way of thinking viz. the new frame of mind) purposiveness stands for (and this also means the *tension* or contradiction between *form* and *content* that goes hand in hand with it) does not remain within the limits of concrete purposes. It is just the opposite. This view (or rather this pattern, this way of thinking viz. this frame of mind) spreads to other contexts, and indeed in such a way that it is capable of nothing less than making *everything* appear in a *new light*. Or, to be more precise, *Zweckmäßigkeit* has a *dynamic of its own* (it has, as it were, an *unrest* or *disquiet* of its own and – *sit venia verbo* – a “logic” of its own) which ultimately leads to putting *everything* under *its pressure*. And the upshot is that it does not confine itself to overcoming *Zufälligkeit* and aiming at “essentiality” (at what Hegel terms the *Wesentlich werden*) *within a limited scope*. In the final analysis, it tends to go beyond all limited fields of application and to seek nothing less than *complete essentiality* (complete *Wesentlich werden*), complete *removal of all Zufälligkeit*.

Now, this means two things. Firstly, it means that the form of *Zweckmäßigkeit* requires more than finite purposes; for it raises the question of their own purpose, and so on and so forth, as long as the *content* remains finite. In other words, the very form of *Zweckmäßigkeit* runs counter to all *short-range* purposes, and indeed in such a way that by its standards even the longest-range purposes become short-ranged. Secondly, it also means the following: the form of *Zweckmäßigkeit* is such that it has the power to place *pressure* on *everything* else. That is, it *can* (and, in the long run, it *tends* to) raise the question of purpose in relation to all objects, without exception – the result being what might be described as an *unlimited generalization* of the “what-for”- (or the “for-what-purpose”)-*question*: a *global* “What-for?” or “For what purpose?”, as it were, and a way of seeing things in terms of purpose, according to which *purpose* – essentiality in the aforementioned sense – is the be-all and end-all of everything.

In other words, the form of *Zweckmäßigkeit* is such that it sets the course for what might be described as a *quest for absolute essentiality* – for something that is able to “redeem” all objects or to “rescue” them from purposelessness: the quest for some content or determinacy that is able to give *everything full purpose and meaning* (so that it turns out that, after all, nothing is *zufällig* and not only the whole scheme of things but indeed everything without exception is anchored, as it were, in the exact opposite of *Zufälligkeit*). Put another way, the very form of *Zweckmäßigkeit* eventually leads to the quest for a *springhead of purpose* or (allow me to mix my metaphors) for an *Archimedean point of purpose* from which it becomes possible *to lift the world*. In short, the form of purposiveness is such that it ultimately prompts the quest for some content (some *Inhalt*) that proves to be up to this task – so that the above mentioned contradiction between form and content can only be solved by such an *Inhalt*.<sup>19</sup>

*ded* in what Hegel is trying to highlight, namely *purposiveness (subjective Zweckmäßigkeit) itself* and as such, c) purposiveness as such is something *prior to* and *independent from* teleology in the sense of an explanatory principle or explanatory model. It should also be noted that all teleological explanations are questionable, not only because it is doubtful whether they are valid as explanations, but because of the afore-mentioned *mismatch* or *conflict* between what Hegel terms the *form* and the *content* of purposiveness – that is, because it is doubtful whether the contents in question are adequate as “teleological” contents (whether they are up to the task of meeting the extraordinary challenge of purposiveness as such).

<sup>19</sup> What we are dealing with here is, as it were, the “identikit picture” of nothing less than a self-determining concept capable of *sustaining the whole pressure of finality*; and this, in turn, means the “identikit picture” (the formal picture) of something capable of *stopping the chain of ends that are means to further ends that are means to further ends*, etc. In other words, what we are dealing

Now, all this means that, if completely developed, the very *form* of *Zweckmäßigkeit* eventually casts this new light on every object and tends towards this global aim, so that in the end it amounts to nothing less than complete change of the whole pattern of objectivity (once again both as regards *each object* and as regards the *relational network* between non-identical objects). The point is that even a *minimum* of *Zweckmäßigkeit* is more than enough to trigger this change of pattern: no matter how limited the purpose,<sup>20</sup> the very fact that there is a *certain amount of purposiveness* not only brings with it something *groundbreakingly new*, but indeed something that transcends each specific application (viz. each specific field of application) of the idea of purpose. In short, no matter how limited the purpose, the very form of *Zweckmäßigkeit* already contains in itself a huge potential for *comprehensive* and indeed *global* transformation.<sup>21</sup>

And this is why, from the very beginning – even when *Zweckmäßigkeit* seems to mean nothing more than an *enclave* – or at most an *archipelago* of scattered “islands” viz. of limited “pockets” of purposiveness – and it seems self-evident that it cannot be more than this, on closer inspection it turns out that there is more in it than meets the eye, so that this alleged self-evidence proves to be misleading: in the final analysis, purposiveness stands for a whole *new way of seeing things* viz. for a whole *new framework of objectivity* – and it is no exaggeration to say that it puts a new complexion on literally *everything*.<sup>22</sup>

with here is the “identikit picture” of what might be termed both a *universal* and an “*absolute*” *purpose*. We could also speak of a universal and absolute *nostos* of the whole “journey” (of the whole “*odyssey*”) of everything. It does make sense to speak of a *νόστος*, not least because this word does not mean only – and in a way does not mean primarily – “return” (*reditus, domum reverti* viz. *reverti eo, unde egressus est*). It stands rather a) for *emerging unscathed from the journey* and b) for a *destination* capable of giving sense and meaning to the whole journey as such. And we can speak of an “*identikit picture*” (or – better still – of a *formal “identikit picture”*) because in this case, too, we do not know what this concept stands for (and, one might add, whether there is something corresponding to it). On the meaning of *νόστος*, see notably: Curtius (1874); Schmidt (1876, 505); Chantraine (1941); Frisk (1960, 304ff.); Ruigh (1967, 369); Verdenius (1969, 195); Pokorni (1969, 766); Létoublon (1985, 175f.); Valgiglio (1985); Bader (1986, in particular 488ff.); Führer (1997); Chantraine (1999, 774f.); Bonifazi (2009); Beekes (2010, 1008); Dieu (2010); de Lamberterie (2011).

<sup>20</sup> And this, too, is what “*content*”, as opposed to *form*, stands for: namely, the *short range* character viz. the *limited* character (the *self-enclosed* character) of a given *connection of purpose*.

<sup>21</sup> So that in a way what we are dealing with here is the inversion of the *mons parturiens* fable by Phaedrus in *Fabulae Aesopiae* IV, xxiii: in this case the “mouse” gives birth to a “mountain” (and indeed to a formidable mountain) (Mueller 1885, 42).

<sup>22</sup> Before we go on, let me add three remarks: 1) Hegel does not breathe a word about this, but the thing is that the rise of *Zweckmäßigkeit* is *irrevocable*. As a matter of fact, it is so irrevocable that, even if the quest for purpose turns out to be completely *hopeless*, the result is by no means that *Zweckmäßigkeit* is *cancelled*. Put another way, even in this case the result is by no means the complete absence of all *Zweckmäßigkeit* (the complete absence of this whole framework of sense viz. of “sense-making”). We can also say that even in this case the result is by no means something completely *unrelated to purpose or purposiveness*. No: if we are unable to find any purpose, the result is rather a state of *privation* – i.e. *purposelessness* or *lack of purpose* (what Greek terms like “μάτην”, “ματαιῶς”, “μάψ”, “ἄλλως”, “εἰς κενόν”, “κενῶς”, “διακενής”, “ἄσκοπα”, etc. and Latin terms like “frustra”, “vanum”, “in vanum”, “temere”, “incassum”, “nequicquam”, etc. stand for. Put another way, the result is what Nietzsche termed “„Umsonst“, ohne Ziel und Zweck”, “die Qual des „Umsonst“, “das Pathos des „Umsonst“, “das allgemeine Umsonst“, “„Wozu?“, „Umsonst!“, „Nada!“ (Nietzsche 1980), Nachgelassene Fragmente Sommer 1886-Herbst 1887, 5[71], vol. 12, 213, Nachgelassene Fragmente Ende 1886 – Frühjahr 1887, 7[8], vol. 12, 292, Nachgelassene Fragmente November 1887 – März 1888, 9[60], vol. 13, 46, Zur Genealogie der Moral, § III-26, vol 5, 406, Nachgelassene Fragmente Frühjahr 1888, 15[32], vol. 13, 428. And, what is more, even if it turns out that the very idea of purpose (viz. the idea of universal, all-embracing purpose) is *contra-*

But all this begs the question: What exactly is purpose? What constitutes it as such? What is so special about it?

Towards the end of his introductory remarks on teleology Hegel gives a first detailed description of what purposiveness is all about. He compares *Zweck* (*purpose*) to Kant's faculty of judgment – and in particular a) to the *determining* faculty of judgment (*bestimmende Urteilskraft*) and b) to the *reflective* faculty of judgment (*reflektierende Urteilskraft*). According to Hegel, the former “subsumes the particular under the universal. Such a universal that only *subsumes* is an *abstraction* that becomes *concrete* only in an *other*, in the particular. Purpose, on the contrary, is the *concrete universal* (*das konkrete Allgemeine*) containing within itself the moment of particularity and of externality (*das in sich selbst das Moment der Besonderheit und Äußerlichkeit hat*); it is therefore active and the impulse to repel itself from itself (*daher tätig und der Trieb ist, sich von sich selbst abzustoßen*). The concept, as purpose, is of course an «*objective judgment* in which one determination, the subject, namely the concrete concept, is self-determined, while the other is not only a predicate but external objectivity / ein *objektives Urteil*, worin die eine Bestimmung das Subjekt, nämlich der konkrete Begriff als durch sich selbst bestimmt, die andere aber nicht nur ein Prädikat, sondern die äußerliche Objektivität ist» (Hegel 1981, 159).

This comparison between purpose and *determining judgment* emphasizes two main points. First, purpose is from the very outset quite different from a “simple” universal, for it has nothing to do with the universal and the particular *as separated from one another*. Purpose is rather what Hegel calls the concrete universal (*das konkrete Allgemeine*). Its *concreteness* has to do with the fact that it includes in itself the moment of *particularity* –

*dictory, absurd* or the like, the result is not that we get *completely rid* of this idea; it is rather what might be described as the *negation of purpose* as such viz. of universal purpose (that is, something *essentially related to it*). In other words, even in this case the result has an essentially *apophatic* character and bears the unmistakable imprint of the idea of purpose. In short, once it has risen, purposiveness – the idea of *purpose* – “is here to stay”.

1) Although Hegel does not refer explicitly to this, everything he writes on this subject suggests that *Zweckmäßigkeit* establishes its own set of requirements. It is a new form of “sense-making” that is independent of any other; and it entails a new form of “rootedness” (of “foundation” or “anchoring”) viz. of *lack thereof*. Indeed, this is so much so that even supposing everything is firmly “rooted”, say, in a chain of rigorous explanation (viz. in a chain of *absolute necessity*), it can still lack the kind of “root” we are talking about and be absolutely *ungrounded* and *rootless* as far as *purpose* is concerned. In other words, the very same thing can be at the same *time firmly rooted* in one sense and *absolutely rootless* in the other; and nothing prevents the *absolutely necessary* from being nothing less than *absolutely purposeless or pointless*.

2) Hegel's analysis draws attention to the possibility of what might be described as a purpose-related variety of “n'importequisme” or “no-matter-whatism” (roughly speaking, I use this word in the sense it was given by Binet & Simon (1907, 297, 326) and by Binet & Simon (1908, 137, 142). As pointed out above, “no-matter-what” can play the role of purpose. And one can speak of “no-matter-what” (and of “n'importequisme” viz. of “no-matter-whatism”) in this context a) because of the way concrete *Zwecksetzung* (concrete purposes, concrete “determination of aims”) fails to meet the standards set by the very *form* of *Zweckmäßigkeit* as such, and b) because of the way it also *fails to notice* that it does not meet these standards, so that the *conflict and tension* highlighted by Hegel *remain overlooked*. But the point is that this “n'importequisme” can be found both in the case of particular purposes (the purpose of this or that particular thing or set of things) and in the case of “universal”, *all-embracing purpose*. As pointed out above, Hegel's claim is that the *form* of purposiveness goes far beyond its *contents*; the result being that the realm of purposiveness is characterized by this intriguing *non-compliance* or this *mismatch* (this inner conflict and tension) *between content and form*; and, as it turns out, there are hardly any limits to this specific kind of mismatch or “n'importequisme”: it can be coextensive with the whole realm of purposiveness (that is, with all its contents).

for the concept in question is intrinsically related not just to itself or its own content, but to *externality* as such and to the connection between itself and externality (which in this case plays the role of the particular). In other words, the concept lying at the heart of purpose is such that its own content (so to speak the universal moment) is in itself intrinsically focused on *externality* (on its relation to externality – and this means both a) to the fact that objectivity remains external and b) to the project of getting rid of this externality). This is why Hegel speaks of *tension*: of activity (*Tätigkeit*) and of the *impulse to repel itself from itself* – namely to repel itself *from its present condition* (from what keeps itself and objectivity apart from each other – and this also means the impulse to repel the externality the concept in question both includes in itself and rejects). So much for the first point. The second concerns the following: purpose is of such a nature that it turns out to be a *judgment* (*Urteil*), not a simple concept. On closer inspection it emerges that from the very outset it includes two essential components corresponding to the above mentioned tension, namely a) the concept in question, as something self-determining, and b) something else, namely not only a predicate but indeed nothing less than *external objectivity itself* (*die äußerliche Objektivität*: what is already there, *das Vorhandene*) acting as predicate. And the point is that the relation between the two components in question is *not mere juxtaposition*. It is rather a *judgment* connecting a) and b) – we can perhaps speak of a *tense and contradictory identification of a) and b)*.

However, according to Hegel, the fact that there is a world of difference between purpose and *determining* judgment does not mean that purpose has any similarity with Kant's reflective judgment:

But for that reason the connection of purpose (*Zweckbeziehung*) is not a reflective judgment that considers external objects only according to a unity, as though an intelligence had given them to us for the convenience of our faculty of cognition; on the contrary, it is the truth that exists in and for itself and judges objectively, determining the external objectivity absolutely / sondern sie ist das an und für sich seiende Wahre, das *objektiv* urteilt und die äußerliche Objektivität absolut bestimmt /. The connection of purpose is therefore more than a judgment; it is the *sylogism* of the self-subsistent free concept that through objectivity unites itself with itself in conclusion / sie ist der *Schluß* des selbständigen freien Begriffs, der sich durch die Objektivität mit sich selbst zusammenschließt/. (Hegel 1981, 159)

Now, this comparison between purpose and *reflecting judgment* emphasizes two main points. First, Hegel stresses that the concept lying at the heart of purpose does not limit itself to figuring out the unity of a given manifold of objects. It is rather the other way around: the starting point is *a concept* (and this means: something *Selbstbestimmendes*); and the concept in question is constituted in such a way that it plays the role of «the truth that exists in and for itself and judges objectively, determining the external objectivity absolutely». In other words, the concept in question imposes its claim (its validity) and its agenda to external objectivity – and indeed in such a way that it seeks to tailor external objectivity to its own requirements. Here we are dealing with what we have termed the *prescriptive* component (but in such a way that now the *prescriptive* component has *gained autonomy*, as it were, and forms *the starting point*). The self-determining concept we are talking about places itself *at the origin of objectivity*: as the origin of objectivity – as if it *preceded* it. That is, it places itself on the “eve” of objectivity, as the *starting point of objectivity*: as something with *power* over it (namely with the power of tailoring external objectivity to its own requirements). And in doing so, it prescribes what might be termed a *non-external objectivity* (*i.e.*, it prescribes the *negation* or *removal* of *externality* – *Äußerlichkeit* – as such).

But, as pointed out above, here, too, Hegel emphasizes a second point. As it turns out, purpose is not a judgment: it is “more than a judgment” – it is a *sylogism*, *i.e.* a *chain of*

*judgments*. This has to do with the above-mentioned tension viz. with the fact that the judgment connecting the specific concept we have been talking about and objectivity is *ir-reducibly complex*. It comprises a) the original connection between the concept in question and objectivity (the basic connection that triggers everything else, including the conflict viz. the tension between both), b) the conflict between the said concept and objectivity viz. the judgment expressing this conflict and c) the prescribed resolution of this conflict (the judgment expressing what we have termed non external objectivity, *i.e.*, the aim proper).<sup>23</sup> But this is not all. Hegel's point is that *purpose* stands for more than just a multiplicity of judgments. According to him, it stands for a dynamic connection between them, namely for a *chain of judgments*. The original connection between the self-determining concept in question and objectivity provides the starting point for this chain of judgments; and its other components have to do with the *conflict* between the self-determining concept in question and objectivity viz. with the prescriptive/dynamic element Hegel's *Abstoßen* is intended to denote. Put another way, the syllogism or the chain of judgments Hegel refers to expresses the *complex* structure of the *prescriptive* component and the *dynamic* connection between the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of the prescribed change. In short, the chain of judgments we are talking about mirrors both the whole range of tension between the starting point and the destination point of purpose and the various stages of the development (or change) purpose is all about from the outset. But there is more. The chain of judgments – the transition – that forms the backbone of purpose is intrinsically related both to an element of *anticipation* and to its *fulfilment*. Or rather it is intrinsically related both to the *prescriptive* component and to its *fulfilment*. But this means that the *terminus ad quem* viz. the conclusion of this chain of judgments is nothing other than the *fulfilment* of its *terminus a quo*. That is, in a way, the conclusion *comes full circle* and returns to the beginning; for in it, as Hegel puts it, the self-determining concept (*i.e.*, the root and starting point of purpose) *comes to itself*. And this is why Hegel plays with the connection between a) *Schluss*, b) the idea of syllogism and c) the semantic complexity of *Zusammenschliessen* – and writes that the «connection of purpose is (...) the *syllogism* of the self-subsistent free concept that through objectivity unites itself with itself in conclusion / Die Zweckbeziehung ist (...) der *Schluß* des selbständigen freien Begriffs, der sich durch die Objektivität mit sich selbst zusammenschließt» (Hegel 1981, 159). Whether intentionally or not, Hegel is taking up Aristotle's idea of a “progress or advance towards itself” (εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπίδοσις), as laid down in the second book of the *De anima* (417b 6-7) and using it to describe the essential nature of purpose. Purpose is not only an instance of εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπίδοσις – in Hegel's view it is where the εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπίδοσις, as it were, first *awakens* to itself and takes the stage *as itself*.

#### 4. “Subjective end” – purpose under a magnifying glass

Up to now we have considered Hegel's characterization of purpose in his introductory remarks on teleology. But this characterization is completed and developed by his more comprehensive description of subjective end (or subjective purpose) as such. Let us take a look at the latter.

First of all, Hegel returns to some of the topics he already dealt with in the preliminary remarks. He insists that purpose is a *concrete objective concept* (*konkreter objektiver Begriff*); and then he writes: «Its determinateness or its simple difference now has the *determinateness of externality* (*die Bestimmtheit der Äußerlichkeit*) within it, and its simple unity is therefore the unity *that repels itself from itself and in this repelling maintains itself* / die von sich selbst abstoßende und darin sich erhaltende Einheit» (Hegel 1981, 160 –

<sup>23</sup> Namely, objectivity = purpose (or objectivity = the self-determining concept in question).

emphasis added). In short, he insists that a) purpose is a *concrete* and *objective* concept (the point being that it is concrete precisely because it is objective, *i.e.* intrinsically *objectivity-related*), b) the concept in question *includes* within itself *externality* (*die Äußerlichkeit*), c) the unity of this concept is characterized by what Hegel terms the *sich selbst Abstoßen* (the fact that it *repels itself from itself*), and d) the unity of this concept is such that *it maintains itself in repelling itself*. All this is closely connected with the fact that «purpose (...) is the subjective concept as an essential striving and impulse to posit itself externally / der subjective Begriff als wesentliches Streben und Trieb, sich äußerlich zu setzen» (Hegel 1981, 160).

We have already addressed most of these topics, so there is no need to discuss them further. But one aspect deserves special attention, namely what exactly Hegel has in mind when he speaks of «the unity that repels itself from itself and *in this repelling maintains itself* / von sich selbst abstoßende und darin sich erhaltende Einheit». The key to this is, once again, the above mentioned *prescriptive* component and the way it is linked to something along the lines of Aristotle's εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπίδοσις. The particular kind of determinacy (and therefore the particular kind of unity) “purpose” stands for is characterized by the fact that it is *at odds with itself* (that it entails an element of tension and *conflict with itself*), so that it is intrinsically directed to another version of itself (*i.e.* to change *viz.* to a movement away from its present state). In other words, purpose is *essentially Abstoßen* – the *Abstoßen* is *absolutely essential to it*. Or, as Hegel puts it, its “*simple unity*” is the unity that repels itself from itself. And this, in turn, means that purpose cannot be what it is without this *Abstoßen* (without the said tension and conflict: without being at odds with itself) – and therefore that it cannot *maintain itself* without this repelling itself from itself. In short, purpose maintains itself only insofar as it repels itself from itself. Otherwise it fades away.

Secondly, Hegel highlights *the root and starting point* of purpose *viz.* the pivotal role played by the self-determining concept. He expresses its autonomy by emphasizing the fact that «it is *exempt from transition* / es ist dabei *dem Übergehen entnommen*» (Hegel 1981, 160 – emphasis added). By this he means that the self-determining concept that lies at the heart of purpose is characterized by the fact that it *precedes* the *Übergehen* (*viz.* change: the movement towards another state) and that it is *not just a moment of it*. In other words, the self-determining concept *is there prior to any Übergehen*. What is more, the self-determining concept is *the origin* of the *Übergehen* in question. In short, purpose is all about something *prior* to the *Übergehen* – it is all about an *antecedent* to the *Übergehen*: it is all about this “*eve*” of the *Übergang* as such.

Hegel's comparison between a) *Zweck* and *Kraft* (subjective end or purpose and *force*) and b) between *Zweck* and *Substanz* *viz.* *Ursache* (subjective end or purpose and *substance* *viz.* *cause*) provides further clarification of this topic. As he puts it, purpose «is neither a force expressing itself, nor a substance or a cause manifesting itself in its accidents or effects / weder eine Kraft, die sich äußert, noch eine Substanz und Ursache, die in Akzidenzen und Wirkungen sich manifestiert» (Hegel 1981, 160).

Let us begin with the first comparison *viz.* with the difference between purpose and *force* (*Kraft*): «To the extent that force has not expressed itself, it is only an abstract inner (ein abstrakt Inneres); or again it first has existence (*Dasein*) in an externalization to which it has to be solicited / erst in der Äußerung, zu der sie sollizitiert werden muß» (Hegel 1981, 160). On the one hand, as Hegel points out, force is an *abstract inner* (ein abstrakt Inneres). That is, it is viewed *from the standpoint of its Äußerung*, as the *inner core* (the inner content) of which the *Äußerung* is a manifestation. The result being that its basic determination (and indeed its only *concrete* determination) is the determination of its *Äußerung*. On the other hand, force is always viewed from the standpoint of its *Äußerung* in the sense that it is represented *post factum*, as it were: *from a hindsight perspective*. To

be sure, force is conceived of as something *preceding* the *Äußerung* – and there is nothing preventing us from referring to a force long before there is any *Äußerung* or *manifestation* of it. But the point is a) that this “before” is, as it were, essentially *retrospective* (it is only *inferred* from the *Äußerung*: it is a “retrospective πρότερον”), and b) that even when we refer to a force prior to its manifestation we do so because we *anticipate* its *Äußerung* (so that in the final analysis even in this case the force comes on stage only *retrospectively*: *from the standpoint of its Äußerung viz. from a hindsight perspective*).<sup>24</sup> But, in Hegel’s view, what characterizes purpose is the exact opposite. In this case, it is the other way around: a purpose *is there* and has *existence (Dasein) prior to its manifestation or externalization*. First, it is not abstract: it has to do with a concrete determination; and its concrete determination *precedes* the determination of its *Äußerung*: the *Äußerung* is but a *moment* of it. Furthermore, purpose is of such a nature that it cannot be if there is no “insider’s view” (if nobody is in *direct* contact with its concrete determination). It is, as it were, something *intrinsically* “from within”, something *intrinsically* “Inneres” (a “concrete inner”). In short, Hegel’s point is that both this *concreteness* and this “insidedness” (this “insider view”) are “the very soul” of what *purpose* is all about. Secondly, he also stresses that there is *nothing retrospective* about purpose – it is, as it were, *intrinsically prospective* (future-related and anticipatory). It is not *post factum*, but rather essentially *ante factum*. The *ante factum* (not an *indirect ante factum*, but the *ante factum proper* or the *ante factum* “itself”) is its “natural place”.

Now, according to Hegel, pretty much the same holds true for the difference between purpose and *substance* viz. *cause*, so that we do not need to dwell long on the second comparison: «The same applies to cause and substance. Since they have actuality only in the accidents and in the effects, their activity is the transition (*der Übergang*) against which they do not maintain themselves in freedom / *gegen den sie sich nicht in Freiheit erhalten*» (Hegel 1981, 160).

Of course, none of this is to deny any similarity between purpose and *force*, *cause* or *substance*. Hegel’s point is that, however great the similarity between them, there is something radically different about purpose, so that in this case one can say that *where similarity abounds, dissimilarity abounds much more*. And the upshot is that force, cause or substance can be used to describe purpose only if they form part of an oxymoron:

Purpose can of course also be defined as a force or a cause, but these expressions cover only an incomplete side of its signification /*erfüllen nur eine unvollkommene Seite seiner Bedeutung*/; if they are to be said of purpose according to its truth, this can be done only in a way that sublates their concept /*so können sie es nur auf eine Weise, welche ihren Begriff aufhebt*/ – as a force that solicits itself to expression /*als eine Kraft, welche sich zur Äußerung sollicitiert*/, or a cause that is a cause of itself or whose effect is immediately the cause / *als seine Ursache, welche Ursache ihrer selbst, oder deren Wirkung unmittelbar die Ursache ist*. (Hegel 1981, 160)

Having established this, Hegel then addresses a third question concerning the role played by *universality*, *particularity* and *singularity* as essential components of the structure of purpose. Or, to be more precise, he tries to depict the *Schluß* (the syllogism or the chain of judgments) underlying purpose in terms of universality, particularity and singularity. He writes:

Within, therefore, it [purpose] is essentially *sylogism (Schluß)*. It is the self-equal *universal* (*das sich gleiche Allgemeine*); more precisely, inasmuch as it contains self-repelling negativity /*und zwar als die sich von sich abstoßende Negativität enthaltend*/, it is universal though at first

<sup>24</sup> So that it plays its role in what grammar terms the “future perfect”.

still *indeterminate activity* /zunächst die allgemeine, insofern noch *unbestimmte Tätigkeit*/. But since this activity is negative self-reference /aber weil diese die negative Beziehung auf sich selbst ist/, it *determines* itself immediately and gives itself the moment of *particularity* /bestimmt sie sich unmittelbar und gibt sich das Moment der *Besonderheit*/, and this particularity, as likewise the *totality of the form reflected into itself*, is *content* as against the *posited* differences of the form /welche als die gleichfalls *in sich reflektierte Totalität der Form Inhalt* gegen die *gesetzten* Unterschiede der Form ist. The same negativity, through its self-reference, is just as immediately the reflection of the form into itself and *singularity* / Eben [so] unmittelbar ist diese Negativität durch ihre Beziehung auf sich selbst absolute Reflexion der Form in sich und *Einzelheit*. (Hegel 1981, 160-161 – emphasis added)

Let us take a look at what this means. First it must be borne in mind that that the self-equal *universal* (das sich gleiche *Allgemeine*) Hegel is talking about is the *concrete universal*, namely the concrete self-determining concept (a concrete purpose), inasmuch as it includes within itself all the above-mentioned components, and thereby plays the role of the universal. On the one hand, Hegel emphasizes that this universal is *self-equal*. That is, he emphasizes what might be described as the purpose's *identity with itself*. On the other hand, he also stresses its *complexity*, its various components and in particular the fact that it is not only complex, but indeed *at odds with itself* (*i.e.* the element of *tension and conflict*: what he terms *self-repelling negativity*). Furthermore, he draws attention to the pivotal role played by activity (*Tätigkeit*) and to the connection between *self-repelling negativity* and *activity*. His point is that activity (the idea of activity as such) is a *sine qua non* of purpose. Without it there would be no purpose as such – and, in the final analysis, purpose *is all about activity*. But at first activity enters the composition of purpose just as a *universal determinacy*. That is, by its nature purpose includes activity as such (*die allgemeine, insofern noch unbestimmte Tätigkeit*). However, it does not stop there. As Hegel points out, the activity in question *determines* itself immediately: it becomes a) essentially related to the particular instance of conflict and tension – *i.e.* to the focus of resistance to the self-determining concept in question and b) it becomes no less immediately related to something singular as the *terminus ad quem* or aim of the whole process (*i.e.* as the *target* of activity). In short, activity specifies itself into something singular. And this inner specification of activity plays a major role in the inner specification of purpose – *i.e.*, in the process by means of which the above-mentioned *Schluß* moves from the universal to the singular. In its core, the *Schluß* of purpose is the *Schluß* of self-determining activity. In addition, Hegel stresses the fact that this *specification* does not result from the addition of *supervening elements*: it derives exclusively from *self-reflection*: (from the self-reflection of the self-determining concept – *i.e.*, from the self-repelling negativity and the inner process by means of which the form of purpose as such takes the shape of a concrete content).

Finally, Hegel focuses especially on the *terminus ad quem* of the whole in-built dynamics of purpose. He writes: «From the one side, this reflection is the *inner universality of the subject* /*die innere Allgemeinheit des Subjekts*/; from the other side, however, it is *outwards reflection* (*Reflexion nach außen*); and to this extent purpose is still something subjective (noch ein Subjektives), its activity is still directed towards an external objectivity / und seine Tätigkeit gegen äußerliche Objektivität gerichtet» (Hegel 1981, 161).

To understand what he means by this, we need to bear in mind that he now concentrates his attention on *the other end of the interval*, as it were. After having examined both the *root* of purpose and *the chain of judgments* (*viz.* the chain of inner reflexivity) purpose is made of, it is now time to take into account what might be termed the *final result* or “*output*” of the whole chain he has been analysing. And this is where he stops and “takes stock” of purpose as such *viz.* of what is achieved by purpose as such.

In the passage I have just quoted he starts by emphasizing that the whole *Schluß* (the whole chain of judgments) purpose consists of is but the *inner* universality of the subject. The “universality of the subject” denotes the fact that what he terms “subject” – viz. what he terms “concept” – is *very far from being closed in on itself*. Not only does it include a variety of components, but it also has the property of *overflowing its boundaries* and being *directed outward*, so to speak. But all this is strongly counterbalanced by the fact that this universality turns out to be just what Hegel terms an *inner* universality. In other words, although changing external objectivity – tailoring it to one’s own (viz. to the concept’s) requirements – is what purpose is all about from the very beginning, the fact remains that in the realm of objectivity *nothing has really changed: everything remains exactly the same*. For the whole *Schluß* we have been talking about is *still merely subjective*.

To be sure, as pointed out above, purpose revolves around objectivity: it is directed towards changing it, etc. – and indeed in such a way that it anticipates the change it is all about (the removal of externality – and this means achieving what we have termed non external objectivity).<sup>25</sup> But the point is that purpose does so *only in anticipation*, and that anticipation *remains completely within the bounds of the subject*. Hegel himself stresses the fact that the inner reflection that forms the backbone of purpose goes hand in hand with what he terms *outward reflection (Reflexion nach außen)*. And, what is more, this outward reflection is what the inner reflection in question is all about. We can also say that inner reflection leads right to outward reflection, and indeed in such a way that the latter is the whole point of the former. But, when all is said and done, none of these changes the fact that the result of inner reflection – and this also includes the *outward reflection (Reflexion nach außen)* that goes hand in hand with it – does *not* yet mean any *real change*. In short, the “outward” (*nach außen*) in question is but an “inneres Nach-außen” (an “inner outward”, as it were),<sup>26</sup> and the “outward reflection” which is part and parcel of purpose is but an *inner* “outward reflection”, and nothing more.

Hegel insists on this point and discusses the complex structure owing to which purpose, on the one hand, is essentially related to objectivity and anticipates the whole change it is all about, but, on the other hand, remains something *entirely subjective* and does *not* include *a single iota of real change*:

For purpose is the concept that has come to itself in objectivity /der Zweck ist nämlich der aus der Objektivität zu sich gekommene Begriff/;<sup>27</sup> the determinateness that it has given itself there is that of *objective indifference* and *externality* of determinateness /die der objektiven Gleichgültigkeit und Äußerlichkeit/;<sup>28</sup> its self-repelling negativity is therefore one whose moments, being only determinations of the concept itself, also have the form of objective indifference to one another /deren Momente, indem sie nur die Bestimmungen des Begriffs selbst sind, auch die Form von objektiver Gleichgültigkeit gegeneinander haben/. Already in the formal judgment subject and predicate are determined as self-subsistent over and against each other, but their self-subsistence is still only abstract universality (abstrakte Allgemeinheit). It has now attained the determination of *objectivity* /sie hat nunmehr die Bestimmung von Objektivität erlangt/, but, as a moment of the concept, this complete difference is enclosed within the simple unity of the concept /aber als Moment des Begriffs ist diese vollkommene Verschiedenheit in die einfache Einheit des Begriffs eingeschlossen. (Hegel 1981, 161)

<sup>25</sup> That is, a “state of affairs” in which objectivity = purpose.

<sup>26</sup> Hegel does not use this expression, but, if I am not mistaken, it sums up what he says.

<sup>27</sup> Put another way, purpose is the very first unfettered *Begriff*: it is *no longer* sunk in objectivity – it has, as it were, *got home*.

<sup>28</sup> It comes to itself as something opposed to objectivity – in such a manner that a) it opens one’s eyes to the lack of correspondence between them, and b) what Hegel terms externality (indifference and the like) *makes itself known (appears as such)*.

Let us take a closer look at this. On the one hand, the *Schluß* or the chain of reflection that forms the backbone of purpose is intrinsically related to objectivity and most of the chain links it is made of have to do with objectivity viz. with the fulfilment of purpose – with its implementation in the field of objectivity; the result being that objectivity (and, in particular, what we have termed *non external* objectivity: objectivity shaped by purpose and made equal to purpose<sup>29</sup>) is already there as an essential component (and indeed as the *Leitmotiv*) of purpose. On the other hand, however, purpose is constituted in such a way that it *falls short* of the objectivity (viz. of the *fulfilment*) it is all about, and indeed in such a way that the chain (the process) it includes in itself remains entirely *unfulfilled* (and indeed entirely “enclosed within the unity of the concept”). To be sure, purpose goes *beyond itself*. But it is of such a nature that it falls short of what it is all about and thus falls *behind itself*. Or, as we have put it, purpose is all about objectivity and externality; but everything in it remains purely “internal” (*nur die Bestimmungen des Begriffs selbst*).

This means, of course, *tension* – to be more precise, a *particular kind of tension*; for it is not tension between two determinations *on the same level*: it is rather tension between *concept as such* and *objectivity as such*. That is, concept “itself” and objectivity “itself” become the *protagonists* and take a *collision course* with one another. And the point is that this very tension, this conflict, this battle for hegemony takes place in a battleground created by purpose itself – or rather, in a battlefield resulting from the fact that the two protagonists in question are, as Hegel puts it, «enclosed within the simple unity of the concept / in die einfache Einheit des Begriffs eingeschlossen») – that is, “enclosed within the simple unity” of purpose as such. In other words, there is something *enclosing the two belligerents within itself* – there is something *making them meet each other, putting them in contact* (and therefore *in conflict*) with each other. And this something – without which they would remain apart from each other and would not clash with each other – is none other than purpose.

But, according to Hegel, all this affects the very structure of the chain of inner reflection that forms the backbone of purpose. As pointed out above, purpose is all about removing externality and replacing it with a *non-external and non-indifferent connection between all the different links* of the above-mentioned chain of reflection. But on closer inspection it emerges that the latter – «being only determinations of the concept itself» – «also have the form of objective indifference to one another / indem sie nur die Bestimmungen des Begriffes selbst sind, auch die Form von objektiver Gleichgültigkeit gegeneinander haben» (Hegel 1981, 161). We can also express this by saying that what we have termed the “*prescriptive component*” of purpose points toward a *non-external connection* between the links in question. But the very fact that purpose is just purpose means that the prescribed non-external connection is *still missing* – so that, in the final analysis, there is nothing in it of the *non-externality* or the *non-indifferent connection* it is all about.<sup>30</sup> In short, it is of the very nature of purpose that it “talks the talk” but does not yet “walk the walk”.

All this, in turn, has another consequence that Hegel does not fail to notice:

Now in so far as purpose is this total *reflection* of objectivity *into itself* and is such *immediately, in the first place*, the self-determination or the particularity as simple reflection into itself is distinguished from the *concrete form*, and is a *determinate content* / Insofern nun der Zweck diese totale *Reflexion* der Objektivität *in sich* und zwar *unmittelbar* ist, so ist *erstlich* die Selbstbestimmung oder die Besonderheit als *einfache Reflexion* in sich von der *konkreten Form* unterschieden und ist ein *bestimmter Inhalt* /. Accordingly, purpose is *finite*, even though ac-

<sup>29</sup> The said “state of affairs” in which objectivity *matches* the self-determining concept: objectivity = the self-determining concept.

<sup>30</sup> Otherwise purpose would be *more than just that* – it would cease to be *just purpose*.

ording to form it is equally infinite subjectivity / Der Zweck ist hienach *endlich*, ob er gleich seiner Form nach unendliche Subjektivität ist. (Hegel 1981, 161)

As pointed out above, the very nature of purpose brings out the *opposition* or *conflict* between its “prescriptive component” and *what is still missing* – that is, between the “talk” and the “walk”. Each of them appears in its full difference. And the upshot is that purpose itself – the whole chain of purpose *as long as it remains enclosed within the boundaries of the subject* (as long as everything in it is but a set of determinations of the concept itself) – turns out to be *a mere component* (or, as Hegel puts it, a “determinate content”) in the realm of what it is all about.<sup>31</sup> We can also express this by saying that purpose (the whole chain of purpose Hegel has just described) turns out to be but the “wick” (an essential – and, in a way, *the* essential component, but nevertheless just a *component*) of *its own* “flame” – and indeed in such a manner that in this case the “wick” a) *prescribes* and “orders” the “flame” but nevertheless b) *falls short of the* “flame” and is itself tantamount to *the complete absence of the* “flame”.

But this is not all. Hegel’s point is also that this *internal finitude* of purpose (the fact that it *does not live up to itself* and remains “internally hampered” by the very opposite of what it is all about) is closely connected with a second source of finitude, namely the *factum brutum* of external objectivity as such:

Secondly, since its determinateness has the form of objective indifference, it has the shape of a *presupposition* / weil seine Bestimmtheit die Form objektiver Gleichgültigkeit hat, hat sie die Gestalt einer *Voraussetzung* / and from this side its finitude consists in its having before it an objective, mechanical and chemical world to which its activity is directed as to something *already there* / auf welche sich seine Tätigkeit als auf ein *Vorhandenes* bezieht /; its self-determining activity is in its identity thus immediately external to itself, reflection into itself, just as much as reflection outwards / seine selbstbestimmende Tätigkeit ist so sehr in ihrer Identität unmittelbar *sich selbst äußerlich* und so sehr als Reflexion-in-sich, so sehr Reflexion nach außen /. To this extent, purpose still has a truly *extra-mundane* concrete existence<sup>32</sup> – to the extent namely that this objectivity stands opposed to it, just as the latter, as a mechanical and chemical whole still not determined and not pervaded by purpose, stands on its side opposed to it / insofern hat er noch eine wahrhaft *außerweltliche* Existenz, insofern ihm nämlich jene Objektivität gegenübersteht, so wie diese dagegen als ein mechanisches und chemisches, noch nicht vom Zweck bestimmtes und durchdrungenes Ganzes ihm gegenübersteht. (Hegel 1981, 161)

In conclusion, according to Hegel purpose is characterized by this *double finitude*: by *two closely related moments of finitude*. On the one hand, purpose does not live up to itself. On the other hand, the reason why this is so is that it *founders on the rock of external objectivity viz. of its resistance*.

Hegel’s analysis of purpose thus places particular emphasis on *finitude*, *negativity* and *tension* – and on what might be expressed by saying that purpose *is itself a “failure”*; it is not *content with itself*. Put another way, in Hegel’s view purpose is of such a nature that it *requires something other than itself* – something *more* and something *else*. And this, in

<sup>31</sup> It appears as *mere purpose* – and this means as *opposed to something else*. But the point is that this very opposition results from an *internal split within the realm of purpose*. The complex nature of purpose makes it possible that it turns out to be just a component of its own realm – that is, both a) *the whole thing* (but *still in absentia*) and – because it is most of it only *in absentia* – b) just *a part* of it.

<sup>32</sup> The truly *extra-mundane* concrete existence owing to which it is something very different from a force or a substance

turn, means the following: the inner tension that lies at the heart of purpose leads right to an *outward tension* – namely, to this *tension towards something other than itself*:

Consequently, the movement of purpose can now be expressed as being directed at sublating its *presupposition*, that is the immediacy of the object, and at *positing* it as determined by the concept / daß sie darauf gehe, seine *Voraussetzung* aufzuheben, das ist die Unmittelbarkeit des Objekts, und es zu *setzen* als durch den Begriff bestimmt / . This negative relating to the object is equally a negative attitude towards itself, a sublating of the subjectivity of purpose / Dieses negative Verhalten gegen das Objekt ist ebensowohl ein negatives gegen sich selbst, ein Aufheben der Subjektivität des Zwecks / . Positively this is the realization of purpose, namely the unification of the objective being with it, so that their being, which as a moment of purpose is immediately the determination identical with it, shall be as *external determination*, and conversely the objective, as *presupposition*, shall be *posited* rather as determined by the concept / die Vereinigung des objektiven Seins mit dem selben, so dass dasselbe, welches als moment des Zwecks unmittelbar die mit ihm identische Bestimmtheit ist, als *äußerliche* sei, und umgekehrt das Objektive als *Voraussetzung* als durch den Begriff bestimmt *gesetzt* werde. (Hegel 1981, 161-162)

But what does this mean?

On the one hand, Hegel's point is that the *terminus ad quem* viz. the result of the whole inner reflection he has described is as full of tension as the intermediate links of the chain. In other words: as such, purpose is characterized by *overflowing tension*. This tension has to do with *negativity* and expresses itself in what Hegel terms a *negatives Verhalten* (a *negative attitude* or a *negative behaviour*). But on the other hand his point is also that the *negatives Verhalten* in question is intrinsically *complex*. First, the *terminus ad quem* of purpose gives rise to a *negatives Verhalten* (a negative attitude or a negative behaviour) *to the object* (i.e., to its *externality* or its *indifference*): to its *positedness*. As he puts it, the final result of inner reflection is directed at “sublating its presupposition”, the immediacy of the object, and at “positing it as determined by the concept”. Secondly, this negative relation to the object is “equally a negative attitude or behaviour *towards purpose itself*, a sublating of the mere subjectivity of purpose”.<sup>33</sup> Put another way, the *terminus ad quem* of purpose (and, with it, the whole chain of purpose as such) has a negative relation to itself, in the sense that it has a negative relation to its own insufficiency viz. to the fact that it achieves nothing of what purpose itself prescribes.

But this is not all. For, as Hegel points out, this *negative* behaviour or negative attitude (*negatives Verhalten*) goes hand in hand with something *positive*, namely the purpose's *impulse to its own fulfilment*.<sup>34</sup> In other words, purpose as the “wick” longs for its own

<sup>33</sup> «Consequently, the movement of purpose can now be expressed as being directed at sublating its *presupposition*, that is, the immediacy of the object, and at *positing* it as determined by the concept. This negative relating to the object is equally a negative attitude towards itself, a sublating of the subjectivity of purpose. / Die Bewegung des Zwecks kann daher nun so ausgedrückt werden, daß sie darauf gehe, seine *Voraussetzung* aufzuheben, d. i. die Unmittelbarkeit des Objekts, und es zu *setzen* als durch den Begriff bestimmt. Dieses negative Verhalten gegen das Objekt ist ebensowohl ein negatives gegen sich selbst, ein Aufheben der Subjektivität des Zwecks» (Hegel 1981, 161).

<sup>34</sup> «Positively, this is the realization of purpose, namely the unification of the objective being with it, so that this being, which as a moment of purpose is immediately the determinateness identical with it, shall be as *external determinateness*, and conversely the objective, as *presupposition*, shall be *posited* rather as determined by the concept. / Positiv ist es die Realisation des Zwecks, nämlich die Vereinigung des objektiven Seins mit demselben, so daß dasselbe, welches als Moment des Zwecks unmittelbar die mit ihm identische Bestimmtheit ist, als *äußerliche* sei, und umgekehrt das Objektive als *Voraussetzung* vielmehr als [den durch] Begriff bestimmt *gesetzt* werde» (Hegel 1981, 162).

“flame”: the “wick” is driven towards the “flame”. Hegel writes: «Purpose is in it the impulse to its realization, the determinateness of the moments of the concept is externality; the *simplicity* of these moments within the unity of the concept is however incommensurable with what this unity is, and the concept therefore repels itself from itself» (Hegel 1981, 162).

In order to describe this positive moment viz. purpose’s *impulse towards its own fulfilment* Hegel stresses that “the determinateness of the moments of the concept is externality”. He thereby reiterates that the upshot of purpose is a persistent *triumph of externality* (for in the end everything remains the same as before, and purpose achieves nothing of what it is all about). In other words, as far as purpose itself is concerned, *externality*<sup>35</sup> – and this spells *failure* – seems to be the final word. But the point is that this “final word” is at odds with what purpose is all about: “(...) the simplicity of these moments within the unity of the concept is however incommensurable (*unangemessen*) with what this unity is”. The “simple” moments Hegel refers to in this passage have to do with the fact that what purpose intends to unite *remains disunited*: and Hegel uses the word *unangemessen* (*inadequate, unsuitable* – or, as Di Giovanni translates: *incommensurable*) to express the above-mentioned *split* within the realm of purpose and the conflict between a) what makes purpose encompass the whole of what it is all about and b) the fact that at the same time purpose remains just a *part* of this whole.

But what is the *positive moment* that Hegel contrasts with the *negatives Verhalten*? This positive moment stems from the *negatives Verhalten* itself (viz. from the *failure* inherent to all purpose as such). Concept – i. e., purpose – does not resign itself to its failure: it does not accept itself (*i.e.* its own failure) as “the last word”. That is, the positive moment Hegel refers to has to do with the fact that the concept in question – namely purpose – *negates its own negativity* viz. its *negative outcome*. Precisely because it ends up in failure, purpose *rejects itself* or *repels itself from itself* (*stößt sich daher von sich selbst ab*). And this rejection of itself makes it try to *correct itself* or to *remedy itself*.

What we are dealing with here is, of course, a *second Abstoßen* – not the one previously mentioned: the *Abstoßen* that lies at the heart of the inner chain of reflection underlying purpose as such. Here it is important both to *distinguish* between the first and the second *Abstoßen* and to see the *connection* between them. In a way, the second *Abstoßen* – the one we are now dealing with – is the very same *Abstoßen* (the above-mentioned *Abstoßen*, namely the *Abstoßen* that is part and parcel of the syllogism of purpose, *i.e.* a link in the said chain of inner reflection) *enriched* with a second *Abstoßen*, namely with the *Abstoßen* of the insufficiency of the former viz. of its final result within the field of purpose (within the boundaries of purpose as such).<sup>36</sup> In short, this second *Abstoßen* is the *Abstoßen* of purpose itself. Without the first *Abstoßen* there would be no room for the second – and, what is more, the latter is “powered”, as it were, by the former. But the point is that this *second Abstoßen* represents the *culmination point* of purpose and is, as it were, its *final output or outcome*.

The main emphasis is therefore on *non-identity* (on the lack of identity between purpose and itself) and on what might be termed a *leap into “otherness”*. Purpose *rejects itself* because of its insufficiency: because it does not live up to itself and because it *depends on something other than itself for its own fulfilment*. But, nevertheless, it should be

<sup>35</sup> And we might add: indeed, the above-mentioned *double-externality*: both a) externality *between the various links* of the internal chain and b) externality *between purpose and objectivity*.

<sup>36</sup> In other words, the second *Abstoßen* *tries to remedy the insufficiency of the first*. It is at the same time a) the *very same* thing (the very same *Abstoßen*) and b) something *quite different*, for it includes the *Abstoßen* of the first *Abstoßen* (viz. of its insufficiency) and the attempt to save it from failure.

borne in mind that here, too, the development Hegel refers to has nothing to do with the addition of new elements (with something *supervening* or the like). His point is rather that this second *Abstoßen* he is talking about results exclusively *from reflection* viz. from *purpose itself* – and this is why we can speak of a *second reflection*, as opposed to the one that is the driving force of the whole internal chain of purpose as such. Everything depends on the fact that purpose, let us paraphrase Hegel's saying: *dem, was er ist, unangemessen ist*. That is the reason why «the concept [that is, purpose] (...) repels itself from itself». This second repulsion is *Entschluß* – *resolution* or *decision*.<sup>37</sup>

But: what is *Entschluß*?

## 5. Resolution or decision (*Entschluß*) under a magnifying glass

Let us take a closer look at what he writes on this topic:

This repulsion is in general the *resolution* of the self-reference of the negative unity by virtue of which the latter is *exclusive singularity*; but by this *excluding* the unity resolves itself, that is to say, it discloses itself, for it is self-determination, the positing of itself. / Dies *Abstoßen* ist der *Entschluß* überhaupt der Beziehung der negative Einheit auf sich, wodurch sie ausschließende Einzelheit ist; aber durch dies Ausschließen entschließt sie sich oder schließt sich auf, weil es Selbstbetimmen, Setzen *seiner selbst* ist. (Hegel 1981, 162)

First, Hegel emphasizes the fact that the *Abstoßen* in question is an *Entschluß* arising from «the self-reference of the negative unity / *die Beziehung der negativen Einheit auf sich selbst* / that is the fact that the negative unity is in relationship with itself». He also emphasizes that this “self-reference of the negative unity” is such that the latter is intrinsically related to *exclusion* and forms an *exclusive singularity* (*ausschließende Einzelheit*). The point seems to be that, as mentioned before, purpose as such is finite both in regard to itself (insofar as it does not live up to itself) and to external objectivity. In other words, purpose as such *leaves out* a great deal – and indeed nothing less than *what it is all about*. And, what is more, purpose is constituted in such a way that it can (and does) *relate to its own finiteness* (the “negative unity” can – and does – *relate to itself*). It *realizes* that it is finite: that it does not live up to itself. It puts, as it were, “the finger in the wound”, namely that it *leaves out* (or *leaves undone*) what it is all about.

Secondly, Hegel emphasizes that this *exclusion* (or rather the self-reference of this exclusion: the fact that this exclusion *is in relationship to itself*) opens the way to what he describes in terms of *Ent-schließen* and *Auf-schließen*: «(...) but by this excluding the unity resolves itself, that is to say, it discloses itself / aber durch dies Ausschließen entschließt sie sich oder schließt sich auf» (Hegel 1981, 162). It is plain that there is a play on words with *Aus-schließen*, *Ent-schließen* and *Auf-schließen*. But the question is how this play on words is related to the topic.

Let us start with the connection between *Aus-schließen* (*exclude*) and *Auf-schließen*.

It should be borne in mind that in this passage *Auf-schließen* – or rather “*Sich auf-schließen*” – has two possible meanings. It can mean something along the lines of the Lat-

<sup>37</sup> In a way this *Schluß* is the very opposite of the above mentioned *Zusammenschluß* (the *Zusammenschluß* of the εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπίδοσις). Resolution or decision stems from realizing that the real εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπίδοσις is still missing and that the εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπίδοσις that is part and parcel of purpose as such does not fulfil its program. In other words, the point is that the *terminus ad quem* of the first εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπίδοσις turns out to be the very opposite of the fullness of the αὐτὸ – and that the latter remains to be achieved. And this also means that the *terminus ad quem* of purpose turns out to still be a *terminus a quo* for further εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπίδοσις.

in verbs *recludere*, *reserare*, *aperire* (Grimm 1984, cols 725f.).<sup>38</sup> If so, then the point is that by being in relation to what Hegel terms *exclusion*, purpose *opens up to what lies beyond itself* – and thereby becomes what in a way it is from the very beginning, namely: the exact *opposite* of something *self-enclosed*. In other words, because it realizes its *exclusive* character purpose becomes, as it were, *outward-looking* and turns against what makes of it something *exclusive* (in Hegel’s sense of the term) and “closed in on itself”. But “Sich aufschließen” can also be interpreted as conveying the idea of *disclosure* viz. *self-disclosure*.<sup>39</sup> The “negative unity” – purpose as such – discloses itself insofar as it relates to its *exclusive* character (that is, insofar as it *realizes* its own *exclusive* character). If it does not realize this (if it does not realize that it *leaves everything undone*) it misses the whole point; for, as mentioned above, purpose is all about *what it leaves out and undone*. In other words, if it misses its *exclusive* character, purpose *misses itself*, namely: a) that it is all about an εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπίδοσις and b) that the αὐτό in question (namely what purpose is all about) can be achieved only by means of a *still missing* εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπίδοσις (*i.e.* by means of something lying *beyond purpose itself*).

But which of these two meanings of *Aufschließen* is intended here? The fact that Hegel insists on the connection between *Sichaufschließen* and *Selbstbestimmung* viz. *Setzen seiner selbst* (self-determination and self-positing) seems to suggest that *self-disclosure* (namely *disclosure of purpose itself*) is what he has in mind. If this is so, then the point is not so much that *Entschluß* “opens up to the exterior” of purpose, but that it is intrinsically related to the *self-positing* of purpose: *Entschluß* is all about *purpose itself* (not about something *other than* purpose). In other words, the point seems to be that *Entschluß* and the *self-positing* in question is closely linked to *increasing self-awareness of purpose* (*i.e.* to increasing awareness both of itself as the “wick” and of itself as the missing “flame” – and indeed of the difference between both). But then again this very connection between *Entschluß* and self-determination viz. self-positing is not unrelated to an “opening to the exterior”. For the “self” in question is none other than what we have termed the “prescriptive component”: purpose is constituted in such a way that it *falls behind itself* (so that its full “itself” remains *outside itself*). The result being that its real coming to itself (its real positing of *itself*) hinges on the relation between what we have termed the “wick” and the “exterior” (namely the missing “full-fledged flame”). In short, what characterizes

<sup>38</sup> Moni’s and Cesa’s Italian translation interprets *Sichaufschließen* as “si schiude” (opens up). «Questo respingere è la *risoluzione* in generale del riferimento a se dell’unità negativa, per cui essa è individualità *esclusiva*; ma mediante questo escludere essa si *risolve*, ossia si *schiede*, perché costesto è un *determinarsi*, un porre se stesso» (Hegel 2004, 843). Labarrière’s and Jarczyk’s French translation goes in the same direction. «Ce repousser est la *décision* en général du rapport à soi de l’unité négative, par quoi elle est singularité *excluante*; mais par cet acte-d’exclure elle se *décide* ou *s’ouvre*, parce qu’elle est *auto-déterminer*, poser de soi-même.» (Hegel 1981a, 257). They add the following remark: «Cette ‘décision’ à agir est, en un sens radical, ce qui fait que le concept s’ouvre (*sich aufschliesst*). Car la détermination de soi par soi qui le caractérise ne peut être dite de façon plus radicale que sous la forme de cette accession à l’extériorité de lui-même». Pretty much the same holds true for B. Bourgeois’ more recent French version: «Cette répulsion est la *résolution* en général de la relation à soi de l’unité négative, par laquelle celle-ci est une singularité *excluante*; mais, par cette *exclusion*, elle se *résout* ou *s’ouvre* à quelque chose, parce que ladite exclusion est auto-détermination, position de soi-même» (Hegel 2016, 211). The same line of interpretation is followed by F. Duque, in his Spanish translation: «Este repeler es la *resolución* en general, la referencia de la unidad negativa a sí, por lo cual la unidad negativa es singularidad *excluyente*; pero por este *excluir*, ella se *resuelve* [o se *desencierra*] en *dirección* a [algo], porque eso es *autodeterminar*, ponerse a uno mismo» (Hegel 2015, 299). He also suggests the following alternative translation: «Podría decirse: ‘por este *excluir*, ella sale del claustro o sea abre su claustro a ... lo otro, se *desencierra*’».

<sup>39</sup> Di Giovanni (2010) translates “discloses itself”.

purpose is precisely the fact that its own full determinateness lies *beyond itself* and *outside itself*, so that its relation to itself requires *openness*. And that is what *Entschluß* (viz. the new self-positing in question) is all about.

And so it turns out that the two possible meanings of *Aufschließen* do not have to be exclusive of one another. In the final analysis, it does not seem unlikely that Hegel plays with both meanings: *opening* and *disclosing*.<sup>40</sup> That is, it cannot be excluded that he is making a twofold point, namely both a) that *Entschluß* is the final development of purpose in which it *opens itself up* and b) that *Entschluß* is the final development of purpose in which it *discloses* itself and “shows its true colours”. And if this is so, there is no point in trying to tie Hegel's words to an *either/or* between two *univocal* senses.

As for his characterization of *Entschließen* and *Entschluß*, Hegel seems to make three points. On the one hand, as we have just seen, he emphasizes the fact that this decisive move has to do with *Selbstbestimmen*, that is, with the *self-determining* component that is a defining characteristic of purpose as such. *Entschluß* would not be possible without this essential component of purpose. And, what is more, it *confirms* and *intensifies* this *self-determining* element. It is, as it were, its culmination point. On the other hand, Hegel seems to be stressing the *prefix* (*Ent-*) and playing with the fact that there is a connection between the second component of the verb (*-schließen*, *-schluß*) and the vocabulary he uses to characterize the inner structure of purpose (*Schließen*, *Schluß*). He thereby stresses the *continuity* between *Entschließen/Entschluß* and the *Schließen/Schluß* that forms the backbone of purpose, while at the same time pointing out that the *Entschließen/Entschluß* he is talking about moves *away* (*Ent-*) from purpose and *goes beyond* purpose.<sup>41</sup> In other words, the *Entschluß* is the final development in which purpose *moves away from* itself (from itself insofar as it does not meet what we have termed its prescriptive component). Or rather the *Entschluß* is the final development in which purpose moves away from what – both in itself and in objectivity – does not meet what we have termed its *prescriptive* component.

But this is not all. There is another shade of meaning to *Entschließen/Entschluß*. To be sure Hegel is far from explicit about this, and all interpretation must be done at our own risk. But the way he expresses himself seems to suggest the idea of an *Ent-Schluß* in the sense of a *syllogism that moves away from purpose*. And, if this is the case, then *Entschluß* stands for a particular kind of *Schluß* or syllogism: the one that *brings purpose out of itself*

<sup>40</sup> On this double meaning of *Aufschließen* viz. *Sichaufschließen*, see for instance Scheller (1789, col. 191-192): «Aufschließen, i. e. eigentlich mit dem Schlüssel öffnen, *recludere*, *clave aperire*, *reserare*, daher tropisch: 1) i.e. öffnen, z. E. sein Herz, die Blumen schließen sich auf etc., *aperire*, *reserare*, *recludere* auch *nudare* z. E. sein Herz 2) i. e. deutlich machen, erklären, *explicare*, auch *solvere*, wenn es sich mit auflösen vertauschen läßt.” and Kraft 1824, 233: “Aufschließen, v. a. eig., 1) *reserare*, *Plin.* *recludere*, *Hor.* *aperire*, *Liv.* die Thüre aufschl. *recludere ostium*, *Plaut.* – *fores*, dem Feinde die Thore –, *recludere portas hosti*, *Quid.* einen Schrank –, – *armarium*, *Plaut.* 2) uneig. öffnen a) von Menschen, *aperire*; *nudare*; *retergere*, *recludere*, *reserare* z. B. sich aufschl. se *aperire*, *Ter.* seine Gedanken, Gesinnungen –, *aperire sententiam suam*, *Cic.* – *sensus suos*, *quid aliquis sentiat*, *Nep.* ähnlich *nudare animum*, *voluntatem*, *Liu.* *recludere mentem*, *Tacit. Ann.* VI, 6, Geheimnisse einer Verschwörung –, *occulta conjurationis retergere*, *ibid.* XV, 74, Geheimnisse –, *res occultas proferre in lucem*, *Cic.* *operta recludere*, *Hor. Ep.* I, 5, 16. *arcana proferre Plin. Pan.* (...) Jmdm seine innersten Gedanken –, *habere aliquem in omni cogitatione coniunctum*, *Cic.* auch, *quae quis intimo pectore sentit*, *aperire alicui*. Jmdm alle Geheimnisse –, *omnia occulta apud aliquem expromere*, *Ter. Heaut.* III, 3, 14. (...) 3) erklären, deutlich machen, *aperire*; *explicare*; *explanare*; *illustrare*, *Cic.* (...) sich aufschl. von Fähigkeiten der Menschen *expergisci*; *evigilare*; *evalescere*, *Bau.* *recludi*; *sese ostendere*; *corroborari*; auch, *bonam sui spem facere*; *bonae indolis signa prodere*. von geheimen, dunkeln Sachen, *patescere*; *illustrari*; *apparere*; *in lucem proferri*; *manifestum*, *clarum fieri*, *Cic.*».

<sup>41</sup> The point being that the prefix *Ent-* conveys the idea of *removal* or *separation*.

or *makes it come out of itself* – namely for its *fulfilment*. If we are to describe the specifics of this *Ent-Schluss* (of this “move-away-syllogism” viz. of this “way-out-syllogism”), we would have the following: a) purpose – that is, purpose as *the whole* of which it is a part: the prescriptive component and universal element owing to which purpose is already intrinsically related to what we have termed the “flame”<sup>42</sup> – plays the role of *universality*; b) purpose as the “wick” (that is, purpose insofar as it *does not live up to itself*) and objectivity insofar as it *does not meet the prescriptive component* of purpose – in short, *what separates the “wick” from the “flame” or the whole (the “flame”) from itself* – play the role of *particularity*; and c) *complete fulfilment of the prescriptive component* (to wit, a state of affairs in which *objectivity completely matches purpose*)<sup>43</sup> plays the role of *singularity*.

Thirdly, Hegel highlights the particular nature of the *terminus ad quem* of resolution or decision (what the *Entschluss* aims at). According to him, once it has come to an *Entschluss*, purpose moves away from itself in such a manner that the *terminus ad quem* of this *Entschluss* is a *new positing of itself (Setzen seiner selbst)* – or rather a new positing of what purpose is all about. In this final development purpose decides to be a new positing of the very thing it revolves about from the start. This new positing of itself (viz. of what purpose is all about) is intended to remedy the insufficiency of the first self-positing (*i.e.* the insufficiency that is a defining characteristic of purpose as such).<sup>44</sup> In other words, this move away from purpose – this “exodus” (this self-negation and self-denial – is, in essence, *self-confirmation, self-assertion and self-fulfilment*. It, too, has the character of an εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπίδοσις.

And this is what resolution or decision (*Entschluss*) is all about: purpose goes beyond itself in order to *fulfil* its own *prescriptive* component (*i.e.* in order to implement the going-beyond-itself that is a defining component of purpose as such, but in such a way that purpose is just purpose precisely because in the same breath *it falls behind itself*<sup>45</sup>). In other words, by repelling itself purpose “shows its true colours”: it takes sides *against itself for something beyond itself* – but in such a manner that this “taking sides against itself” is its way (its only possible way) of remaining *true to itself*.

All this enables us to understand the final development of Hegel’s analysis of purpose. He writes:

On the one hand, in determining itself, subjectivity makes itself into particularity, gives itself a content which, enclosed within the unity of the concept, is still an inner content / Einerseits, indem die Subjektivität sich bestimmt, macht sie sich zur Besonderheit, gibt sich einen Inhalt, der in die Einheit des Begriffs eingeschlossen noch ein innerlicher ist / ; but this *positing*, the simple reflection into itself, is, as we have seen, at the same time immediately a *presupposing* / dies *Setzen*, die einfache Reflektion in sich, ist aber, wie sich ergeben, unmittelbar zugleich ein *Voraussetzen* / ; and at the same moment in which the subject of purpose determines *itself*, it is referred to an indifferent, external objectivity which is to be made equal by it with the determinateness of that inner content, that is to say, posited as something *determined by the concept* – first of all as *means* / und in demselben Moment, in welchem das Subjekt des Zwecks sich bestimmt, ist es auf eine gleichgültige, äußerliche Objektivität bezogen, die von ihm jener innern Bestimmtheit gleichgemacht, d. h. als ein durch den *Begriff Bestimmtes* gesetzt werden soll, zunächst als *Mittel*. (Hegel 1981, 162)

Let us examine this in slightly more detail.

<sup>42</sup> Namely the “flame” *in absentia*.

<sup>43</sup> Real *objectivity* = *purpose*, not just the concept of it.

<sup>44</sup> Because it does not reach fulfilment, the first self-positing that constitutes purpose as such leaves room for a second self-positing of the very same determination. *Entschluss* is this second self-positing of the self-positing determination in question.

<sup>45</sup> *i.e.* it falls behind *its own going-beyond-itself*.

On the one hand, Hegel draws attention to the fact that this new development of purpose he is talking about – *Entschluß: resolution or decision* – still remains “enclosed within the unity of the concept”: it “is still an inner content”. This means that, in a way, *Entschluß (resolution or decision)* shares the purely *subjective character* of purpose as such – and therefore also one of the essential features of purpose, namely that it forms a moment (a “particular content”) within the universal realm of what it is all about.<sup>46</sup> Hegel also expresses this by saying that the new positing (*Setzen*) or this new element of self-determination (*Selbstbestimmung*) that lies at the heart of *Entschluß* is “simple reflection into itself”. But on the other hand, there is a crucial difference, in that this new development – the new positing viz. the new element of self-determination that constitutes *Entschluß* as such – is at the same time immediately a *presupposing (Voraussetzen)*. Hegel’s wording is difficult to render in English, for it involves wordplay on the connection between *Setzen (positing)* and *Voraussetzen (presuppose)*. *Setzen* stands for the concept’s (viz. the subject’s) *self-determining* activity within its own sphere. *Voraussetzen* stands for the immediate presence of objectivity, as something “already there” (as something that *is there beforehand*, in such a way that it is *found*). And the point seems to be that in the case of *Entschluß* the concept’s self-positing ceases to be just a self-positing of the concept; reflection ceases to be just “simple reflection into itself” and becomes *more* than just that: it becomes, as it were, *reflection into objectivity* (reflection into what appears as *something found*). Hegel’s claim is that these two aspects (subject or concept and objectivity)<sup>47</sup> are no longer separate; they *merge together: they become one*. Resolution or decision (*Entschluß*) is *Setzen* (the self-determining concept) intervening in the sphere of *Voraussetzen* (in the sphere of *objectivity: in the sphere of what is found*). In other words, resolution or decision is such that in it concept – purpose – *faces* external objectivity and *engages with* external objectivity. It *takes the shaping of objectivity* (the shaping of the *Voraussetzen*) *in its hands* – and indeed in such a way that indifferent and external objectivity «is to be made equal by it with the determinateness of that inner content, that is to say, posited as something *determined by the concept / ist es auf eine gleichgültige, äußerliche Objektivität bezogen, die von ihm jener inneren Bestimmtheit gleichgemacht (...)* werden soll». <sup>48</sup> According to Hegel, this is the distinctive feature of *Entschluß* and what *resolution or decision* is all about.

To conclude, two remarks are in order. First, it should be noted that Hegel’s wording emphasizes the *Sollen* (the “ought” as such): *Entschluß* engages with external objectivity, «which is to be made equal by it with the determinateness of that inner content, that is to say, posited as something determined by the concept / die von ihm jener innern Bestimmtheit gleichgemacht, d. h. als ein durch den Begriff Bestimmtes gesetzt werden soll» (Hegel 1981, 162 – emphasis added). This *Sollen* corresponds to what we have termed the *prescriptive* component of purpose as such. But the point is that resolution or decision (*Entschluß*) is focused on the *difference* between the prescriptive component and objectivity. In other words, the point is that resolution or decision is concentrated on the *not-yet* as such – or, to be more precise, on the not-yet *as something that goes against the prescriptive component* and *should* therefore be sublated.

Let me explain what I mean. One of the essential features of *Entschluß*, as opposed to purpose, is the fact that the former is *concentrated on what purpose excludes* – that is, on what purpose as such is *unable to include*: on the correlate of its *exclusive* character.<sup>49</sup> We

<sup>46</sup> The result being that *Entschluß*, too, resembles the “wick” in its relation to the “flame”.

<sup>47</sup> Or rather the very thing in objectivity that is *opposed to purpose* and *resists purpose*.

<sup>48</sup> The result being that, without ceasing to be objectivity, it nevertheless ceases to be *external* in the above-mentioned sense of the word.

<sup>49</sup> We could perhaps say *das Ausgeschlossene*.

can also express this by saying that *Entschluß* is concentrated on the difference between a) “objectivity = purpose” in *absentia* (or “objectivity = purpose” as an essential component of purpose as such) and b) “objectivity = purpose” “*in natura*” or “*in propria persona*” (what purpose as such fails to achieve). The final development in purpose is that it *refines* itself, as it were, and gives prominence to its *missing* fulfilment (to the missing *in propria persona*). *Entschluß* is the result of this. It places this *missing fulfilment* (the *not-yet* as such) centre stage and concentrates on what separates the “wick” from the “flame” – or, still more precisely: on the *effective removal* of what separates the one from the other<sup>50</sup>. In other words, resolution or decision revolves around the *missing* “flame”: around the complete suppression of its *missing* character – that is about the *igniting* (i.e. the *self-igniting*)<sup>51</sup> of the missing “flame”.

And this brings us finally to the second remark. Hegel ends his analysis of “subjective end” or purpose with a reference to what he terms “the means”. According to him, «external objectivity (...) is to be made equal (...) with the determinateness of that inner content, that is to say, posited as something *determined by the concept* – *first of all as means (zunächst als Mittel)*».<sup>52</sup> In saying this, he indicates that resolution or decision (*Entschluß*) revolves around the *means (das Mittel)* in the sense that its concentration on *what remains unfulfilled (i.e. its endeavour to sublimate unfulfilment and to remove what separates the “wick” from the “flame”)* raises the issue of the *means* and makes the *means* important. In short, resolution or decision (*Entschluß*) is *all about the means*. But this is not all; for, on the other hand, the *Entschluß* is about *far more than just the means*: from the very outset it is about the *whole* endeavour of *Gleichmachung* (of positing objectivity “as something *determined by the concept*”). And this clearly suggests that what Hegel terms “the means” is but an *intermediate element* of the chain of purpose – that is, just the “first part” of the rest of the story.

<sup>50</sup> And this means what separates them both on the side of the subject and on the side of objectivity.

<sup>51</sup> For the point is that the “wick” itself gives rise to the “flame” and that *concept itself* manages to tailor external objectivity to its own requirements and to achieve the *Gleichmachung* (the *equalizing*: “objectivity = purpose”) Hegel refers to.

<sup>52</sup> « (...) und in dieselben Momente, in welchem das Subjekt des Zwecks sich bestimmt, ist es auf eine gleichgültige, äußerliche Objektivität bezogen, die von ihm jener inneren Bestimmtheit gleichgemacht, d. h. als ein durch den Begriff Bestimmtes gesetzt werden soll, zunächst als Mittel» (Hegel 1981, 162 – emphasis added).

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