<i>SIMPATIA ED ETICA: IN DIFESA DELLA PROSPETTIVA HUMEANA</i>

Autori

  • LORENZO GRECO

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15160/2282-5460/1336

Parole chiave:

History of Philosophy, Hume, Sympathy, Empathy, Moral Point of View, motivation

Abstract

In this essay I reconstruct the role which the principle of sympathy plays in the ethics of Hume. I show that Humean sympathy should not be read in terms of empathy, as many do read it nowadays, and I defend Humean sympathy from those critics for whom it is deleterious to a correct account of morality. I claim that the Humean take on ethics is fundamentally correct: sympathy reveals itself to be indispensable both to finding a common point of view from which to judge morally, and to having a moral perspective that is capable of moving human beings to act according to its dictates.

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Pubblicato

20-01-2017

Fascicolo

Sezione

IL TEMA: ETICA E POLITICA