LA FORMAZIONE DELLE VIRTÙ NATURALI NELL’ETICA RELAZIONALE HUMEANA
Parole chiave:Modern Philosophy, David Hume, Ethics, Character
AbstractIn this article I want to suggest a new interpretation of the role of moral sentiments in forming the natural virtues. I want to claim that the transition from pre-moral traits to authentic individual virtues is guided and sustained by a kind of reflection in which each agent considers their own qualities, starting from how they make their possessor fit to participate in the various spheres of social and affective interaction that constitute their life or towards which it tends. I shall claim that this form of reflection is not merely an enquiry aimed at verifying if one or more characters traits of the agent are useful or immediately agreeable to those who possess them or to others, but involves a recognition of which traits are important to make the kinds of relation that are the agent’s centre of interest thrive. I shall claim that although this reflective process is aware of the situated and contingent aspects of the individual’s existence, it preserves some elements of impartiality and idealization typical of the common point of view, and may therefore be regarded as a form of reflection that produces moral sentiments – sentiments that, in turn, influence the agent’s behaviour.
IL TEMA: CARATTERI II