Making Sense of Research in a Time of Crisis

Kant's Account of the Regulative Use of Transcendental Ideas as a Way to Interpret Sustainability

Abstract

Although ecosystems and society are closely interlinked, a dichotomous conceptualisation of the relationship between them characterizes the Global North, and it determines the current socio-ecological crisis. Philosophy offers useful tools to face this condition and to understand the role of scientific knowledge in finding possible solutions, even if the efforts made do not generate detectable short-term spin-offs. The paper pursues this aim by taking into account the regulative use of transcendental ideas Kant provides in the Critique of Pure Reason  and in particular in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. In this regard, the contribution interprets sustainability as an idea that must be used regulatively. Accordingly, it is conceived not as the concept of an object that is actually given in experience but, on the contrary, as a concept we must presuppose at the beginning of our inquiry and of which we must admit the possibility in order to profitably carry out our empirical researches. In other words, our strive to reach a sustainable relationship between society and ecosystems can only make sense if we presuppose that this relationship is possible in the first place, and therefore only if we assume its concept as a heuristic tool aimed at guiding our empirical researches, i.e. if we use this idea regulatively in Kant’s sense. The analysis adopts an interdisciplinary approach, thus aiming to constitute a bridge between philosophy and human geography.

The process of redefining the relationship under investigation has led the scientific community to propose new terms, such as socio-ecosystem. This allows to identify two previously hierarchically ordered entities as two interdependent elements placed at the same level. The boundary between human and non-human entities dissolves within other conceptual and terminological proposals, such as that of Ecumene. The most recent literature also questions the role of the researchers within society. Indeed, scientific knowledge is generally defined as multi-, inter- or trans-disciplinary and as increasingly co-produced in synergy with different actors.

However, in this regard two main critical aspects persist. On the one hand, the adoption of specific methodologies and the use of peculiar qualitative and quantitative tools by different disciplinary fields limit the development of a unitary knowledge. On the other, the presence of significant political-institutional barriers and power asymmetries often obstacles the implementation of the transformative perspectives highlighted. These two problematic factors determine a condition of uncertainty that threatens to compromise the very meaning of the efforts the researcher puts in his/her inquiry. Indeed, without any guarantee whatsoever of their positive outcome and in dealing with difficulties such as those mentioned above, the researcher could legitimately ask what is the meaning of carrying out an inquiry whose success is anything but certain.

Given these premises, the contribution aims at readdressing the meaning of researchers’ efforts to develop scientific knowledge even if this does not generate detectable short-term spin-offs. It does so by taking into account some conceptual tools offered by Immanuel Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, focusing more particularly on the account of the regulative use of transcendental ideas he provides in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic.

In this regard, the contribution interprets the harmonious relationship between society and ecosystems as a regulative idea. Accordingly, this relationship is conceived of not as the concept of an object that is actually given in experience but, on the contrary, as a concept we must presuppose in our inquiry and of which we must admit the possibility in order to profitably carry out our empirical researches. In other words, our strive to reach a harmonious relationship between society and ecosystems can only make sense if we presuppose that this relationship is possible in the first place (even if it should never fully realize), and therefore only if we assume its concept as a heuristic tool aimed at guiding our empirical researches, i.e. as a regulative idea in Kant’s sense.

In this way, the analysis adopts an interdisciplinary approach, thus aiming to constitute a bridge between philosophy and human geography.