Fichte et le Droit de Révolution dans les “Considérations destinées à rectifier les jugements du public sur la Révolution française‪”‬‬

Abstract

This article investigates the nature and basis of Fichte’s right of revolution in 1793. It aims to show that the latter is twofold, due to the initial division of right into “purely negative right” and “truly affirmative right”, and the existence of a different principle for each of these categories of right, namely : moral law insofar as it obliges and is freedom as the pure form of reason for the former, moral law insofar as it allows and is freedom as the free will of the individual will for the latter. The main aim of this article is to show that it is possible to rediscover the continuity of Fichte’s practical philosophy from the “Beiträge” onwards, by demonstrating that it is only by taking into account this initial division of right that it can be revealed. This division is in fact the point at which – but only at which – the respective domains of morality and law separate, a thesis from which Fichte never subsequently departed.