<i>LA RICEZIONE DELL’ARGOMENTO KANTIANO PER I DOVERI INDIRETTI RELATIVI AGLI ANIMALI NEL DIBATTITO CONTEMPORANEO</i>

Abstract

For Immanuel Kant, respect for animal sensitivity is, first of all, a perfect duty to ourselves and, secondly, an indirect duty regarding animals. In my view, Kant’s theory represents a compelling option for the justification of a coherent and rigorous animal ethics, the potential of which has not been fully appreciated yet. The Kantian argument for the existence of duties to animals is able to justify very strict moral obligations towards animals. Moreover, because of its anthropocentric and logocentric character, Kant’s argument is immune to most of the objections raised against the major animal ethics theories. Finally, Kant’s ethics does not confer moral rights on animals, nor does it claim that direct obligations to animals exist; hence it is immune to the objection that these moral notions cannot be applied to animals. However, the Kantian argument for duties towards animals encounters a serious problem: whether it is possible to justify moral duties to oneself.