La condizione pre-cinematografica della fenomenologia

Note sulla destituzione del mondo come orizzonte fenomenologico attraverso la teoria deleuziana del cinema

Abstract

This paper aims to highlight the way in which Gilles Deleuze’s reflections on cinema operate a removal of the World as a phenomenological horizon, starting from the abolition of intentional polarization. More specifically, I will examine the theoretical framework that allows to understand what Deleuze identified in 1983, in his first volume on cinema, Image-movement, as the “pre-cinematographic conditions of phenomenology”. If for Merleau-Ponty the screen has no horizon, Deleuze draws from this assertion some radical consequences, making cinema no more a perceptive experiment but rather the possible entry into a new image of thought where the universe is conceived as a metacinema. Furthermore, I will underline the extent in which the seventh art invokes for Deleuze a metamorphic machination of the concepts of “world”, “horizon” and “intentionality” coming from phenomenology, substituting phenomena for intensity regimes.